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PLATO AND
THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE
'EPINOMIS'



BY
A. E. TAYLOR
Fellow of the Academy

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I

THE real or alleged linguistic peculiarities of the *Epinomis* have been recently marshalled very fully in a doctoral thesis by F. Müller of Lüneburg,¹ who holds that they compel us to assign the dialogue not to Plato but to an incompetent disciple, presumably the Academic Philippus of Opus, who was *perhaps* regarded as the author by certain unknown persons in later antiquity.² I wish to urge that Dr. Müller's painstaking array of evidence is not so formidable as it might appear at first sight, but leaves the question of authorship still open. In the main I mean to confine myself to a pretty close following of Dr. Müller's particular arguments, and to abstain from advancing independent counter-arguments for the Platonic authorship in which I personally believe. But it is advisable to prefix to my examination of Dr. Müller's thesis a few remarks on some considerations of general principle which, though important in discussions of this kind are, perhaps, too often ignored in practice.

¹ *Stilistische Untersuchung der Epinomis des Philippus von Opus*, F. Müller, 1927. I cannot agree with F. Solmsen (*Quellen u. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, i. 105) that Dr. Müller's conclusion *steht endgültig fest* until the 'other side' has been heard.

² Diog. Laert. iii. 37 ἐνιοί τε φασιν ὅτι Φ. ὁ Ὀπ. τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῦ μετέγραψεν, ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι. We do not know who the 'some' who said these things are, but any attack on the *Epinomis* can hardly have come from an important quarter, since Proclus, who wished to reject the dialogue, fell back on purely internal evidence. Olympiodorus (?), *Prolegg.* 25 ὅτι δὲ νόθον ἐστὶ διὰ δύο δείκνυσιν ὁ σοφώτατος Πρόκλος. Possibly, then, the statement in D. L. means no more than that Philippus 'transcribed' both *Laws* and *Epinomis*.

(1) Internal evidence of the kind on which we have to rely in discussing the authenticity of a 'Platonic' dialogue can rarely be *conclusive*. A work does sometimes 'date itself' by its use of words or phrases which can be fairly proved not to have been in existence before (or after) a certain time. It is obvious that no document mentioning a 'motor-car' can have been written as early as 1870, nor one which alludes to the now notorious 'fourteen points' before 1918. But the *linguistic* evidence available to determine questions about the authenticity of works traditionally assigned to the great names of ancient literature is most often not of this compelling kind. In general it can do no more than create a presumption, of greater or less strength, for or against the traditional ascription. To convert presumption into *proof* we commonly need further evidence of a different kind, whether external, as when the ascription is known to have been contested from an early date by well-informed authorities, or internal, when the work in question can be shown to mention, or allude to, persons and events posterior to the lifetime of the alleged author. Even in dealing with compositions in our own language and dating from comparatively recent times, e.g. in ascribing an anonymous essay of the early eighteenth century to Addison or Steele, or an anonymous lampoon to Swift, it would be unwise to make a confident assertion on no evidence beyond that of vocabulary and diction. But if it may be very hard for an Englishman of to-day to distinguish certainly between Addison and Tickell on such grounds, it is surely still more hazardous to use them as enabling us to discriminate confidently between Plato and an associate and immediate disciple. I think it mistaken in principle to treat peculiarities which might possibly turn the scale, if they were added to other evidence of a different kind, as though they constitute proof by themselves. This is what critics like Dr. Müller are only too prone to do. They prove that the vocabulary and diction of a small work ascribed to Plato have certain peculiarities, not exactly paralleled in other

Platonic dialogues, and treat these peculiarities as *proof* of non-Platonic authorship. But it may fairly be doubted whether any writing of any author, if it extends to more than a very few lines, may not be shown by minute scrutiny, to employ some words, or some combinations of words, not found elsewhere in the work of the same author. Any work of any size commonly has its *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα*. The real question is not whether the *Epinomis* contains some words and constructions peculiar to itself, but whether there are so many of these, and whether any of them are so singular, as to outweigh the presumption of Platonic authorship created by the acceptance of the dialogue as Platonic which seems to have been general from the first.¹ If the *Epinomis* had come down to us under the name of Philippus, the peculiarities noted by Dr. Müller might afford pretty good reason for declining to transfer the ascription of it to Plato; if we knew that the authorship had been disputed in the early Academy they would have almost equal weight. It is another question whether they justify us in taking it away from Plato and giving it to Philippus.

(2) There is a second consideration which should not be forgotten. It is, of course, admitted by Dr. Müller himself that the style of the dialogue, both in vocabulary and in sentence-construction, is in general remarkably like that of the *Laws*. But, it is urged, the peculiarities which mark the *Laws* as a whole are found in the *Epinomis* in a more exaggerated form, and this exaggeration is proof of imitation by an inferior hand. I submit that though this is a *possible* interpretation of the facts, it is not the only interpretation possible. If it is genuine, the *Epinomis* must be the latest

¹ We cannot, so far as I know, *prove* that the dialogue was recognized as Plato's by any one earlier than Aristophanes of Byzantium, who included it in one of his 'trilogies' (D. L. iii. 62). But if the early Academy had felt any doubts, Proclus could hardly have been uninformed on the point. I doubt myself whether linguistic evidence alone would justify the condemnation of any item included in the tetralogies of Thrasylus, except the *Alcibiades* II, and the weight of the linguistic evidence even in that case is commonly over-estimated.

work of a very old man, a man of eighty years or nearly so, who has recently spent a long period in the exhausting task of composing a large and comprehensive treatise ranging over the whole field of ethics, jurisprudence, educational theory, natural theology. A touch of exaggeration in its linguistic peculiarities may easily be explained by regarding it as the latest composition of a writer suffering from fatigue, advancing age, and possibly the actual approach of death. There would be nothing surprising in the fact that a man long past seventy, who had just completed so vast a task, should show the signs of age and of weariness in a marked falling off in power and intensification of peculiarities of manner. It would be more remarkable if no such evidences of weariness and failing skill could be detected. If it is true, as to a certain degree it may be true, that the *Epinomis* is not on a level, in literary quality, with any extensive section of the *Laws*, the explanation may be that it was written after the *Laws* by a very old man, fatigued by the labour of completing the twelve books of the *Laws*.¹ And there is one consideration, at least, which goes some way to confirm this suggested explanation.

We shall see that one marked singularity of the *Epinomis* is that, short as it is, it contains more than one failure to achieve a tolerably grammatical sentence. On the theory of imitation we must suppose that the imitator is exaggerating and caricaturing the not infrequent lesser grammatical irregularities of the *Laws* by deliberately writing what is completely ungrammatical. To my own mind, it seems simpler and more natural to explain both sets of irregularities by the view that we have before us a text never revised by its author, and circulated after his death by disciples whom reverence for the *ipsissima verba* of their

¹ I would suggest that the true method of dealing with the problem is to compare the diction and vocabulary of the *Epinomis* not with that of the *Laws* as a whole, but separately with *Laws*, xii (which must have been written last or nearly last), and with a book like *Laws*, iv, which must have been written considerably earlier.

master forbade to make even those small verbal corrections which all writers need to introduce into their 'fair copies' of their own texts. In fact, the presence of numerous minor irregularities throughout the text of the *Laws* seems to me to admit of no other explanation, in the absence of any reason for thinking that Platonic MSS. have suffered any special depravation throughout the ninth 'tetralogy.'¹ If this is the true explanation of the facts, we should expect the 'irregularities' to be most numerous and marked precisely in the work of the 'tetralogy' which was written last, when the fatigue of the author was at its maximum, and we should find no difficulty in holding that the 'transcriber' of the *Laws* was also the transcriber, not the author, of the *Epinomis*.

(3) We must also not forget that if a work is to be taken away from its traditional author and assigned to some other contemporary on internal evidence drawn from style, it is requisite to the completeness of the argument that there should be extant remains of both writers available for the purpose of comparison. Internal evidence alone might, for example, if impressive enough, justify us in doubting the Shakespearian authorship of a play ascribed to Shakespeare, but could never justify us in assigning it to a contemporary dramatist of whose work no specimen has survived. Now of Philippus of Opus as a writer we know nothing whatever, unless we can first prove that the *Epinomis* is his. We cannot say that if writings of his were to be discovered, they would not prove to be even less like the *Epinomis* than the *Laws* are maintained to be, since we know nothing whatever about his manner. The vague report of Diogenes that 'some'—we do not know who they were, or when they lived—'say that the *Epinomis* is his' cannot really supply the complete absence of the necessary term of the comparison. 'Some'

¹ Why, for example, should A show in the *Laws* signs of depravation from causes which do not affect its text of the *Timaëus* or the *Republic*? This is the insuperable objection to attempts to get rid of the puzzles in the *Laws* by 'emendation'.

persons also ascribe *Alcibiades II* to Xenophon, and it really looks as though, if Xenophon's works had not survived, we should be in danger of being told that that ascription also *steht endgültig fest*.

II

I now proceed to examine Dr. Müller's argument more in detail. He has been careful to indicate (p. 8) that, to be at all conclusive, his inquiry must consider three things, (a) vocabulary; (b) phrasing, sentence-construction, paragraph-construction; (c) the form of the whole work as a dialogue, and a supplement (*Ergänzung*) to the *Laws*. Accordingly, I must say something on all three points, and, to begin with, on Dr. Müller's strictures on vocabulary.

Dr. Müller himself says very truly that too much weight must not be attached to the mere presence in the dialogue of words peculiar to itself, since the *Laws*, a work of unquestionable authenticity, furnishes some thousand such ἀπαξ λεγόμενα. Still there are certain specific words in the *Epinomis* to which he raises objections, and we must consider the weight of these objections.

ἀλληλοφαγία (*Epin.* 975 a 5). Elsewhere Plato says ἀλλήλων ἐδωδή, and the only other example of a compound of ἀλληλο- in his works is ἀλληλοφθορία at *Protag.* 321 a 3. 'This proves that Plato avoids compounds of ἀλληλο-.' But the *Protagoras* instance proves that the avoidance is not absolute. To judge from the lexicons, all such compounds are very rare throughout the pre-Hellenistic period, but a writer who has used such a compound once, and thus clearly has no 'conscientious objection' to them, may surely do so a second time. To urge further that the same meaning is expressed differently in the *Politicus* and *Laws*, by saying ἀλλήλων ἐδωδή is about as convincing as it would be to argue that an English writer who speaks of 'man-eaters' in one book cannot possibly use the word 'cannibals' in another.

παρολιγωρεῖσθαι (991 d 5) is objected to because elsewhere Plato uses the uncompounded ὀλιγωρεῖν. But what is the

force of the criticism when we remember that though he frequently uses the equivalent simple ἀμελεῖν, once or twice he has also the similar compound παραμελεῖν in certainly authentic passages (*Rep.* 555 d 3, 620 c 7)? So, though Plato commonly says for 'accessory causes' συναίτια (or once in the *Laws* μεταίτια), just once (*Tim.* 46 e 6) he uses the curious double compound συμμεταίτια. Indeed, I do not feel quite sure that the παρ- is otiose in the expression of the *Epinomis*, μηδέποτε λήθη μηδὲ ἀμελεία τῶν κρείττωνων ἡμᾶς παρωλιγορησθαι. The sense may well be 'that we have not been incidentally overlooked' by our divine masters, 'in the stress of preoccupation with more important matters'.

ἀπαραμύθητος (*Epin.* 980 d 3). Dr. Müller's objection is that the word is used here of the gods, of whom it is said that they are σχεδὸν ἀπαραμύθητοι τῶν περὶ τὰ δίκαια πράγματα. But when Plato uses the antithetic εὐπαραμύθητον of the gods, he commonly combines it with such words as θυσίαις καὶ εὐχαῖς, 'to be won over by sacrifice and prayer'. Ergo, if he wished to say that they are not to be won over, he would either have added a clause mentioning the means to which they show themselves recalcitrant, or have used the word ἀπαραίτητοι, as he does in the *Laws*. The substitution of ἀπαραμύθητοι is therefore a *Widerspruch zu Platons Sprachgebrauch* (p. 11), and an argument for the unauthenticity of the *Epinomis*. The facts are as Dr. Müller has stated them, but to any one who judges of literature as literature, the inference that a man who once says ἀπαραίτητος when he means *inexorabilis* must always express that idea by just that word should appear curiously precarious.

θεραπεία in Plato means 'tendance' and has to be accompanied by a genitive, (σώματος, καμνόντων, θεῶν, or the like), to indicate the objects tended and the nature of the tendance bestowed on them. But, it is alleged, the word is used in the *Epinomis* without any genitive of further specification, in the sense of *θεραπεία θεῶν, cultus*, as we say (p. 14).

If the case really were as stated, there would be the

gravest difficulty in ascribing the *Epinomis*; I do not say to Plato, but to Philippus, or any fourth-century writer; the use of *θεραπεία* by itself to mean 'divine service', 'worship', would surely be quite unparalleled. But let us look at the actual words of the dialogue, which are quoted perfectly fairly by Dr. Müller himself (*Epin.* 988 a 1 ff.). πολλή δ' ἐλπὶς ἄμα καὶ καλὴ κάλλιον καὶ δικαιότερον ὄντως τῆς ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλθούσης φήμης τε ἄμα καὶ θεραπείας πάντων τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐπιμελήσεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, παιδείαις τε καὶ ἐκ Δελφῶν μαντείαις χρωμένους καὶ πάσῃ τῇ κατὰ νόμους θεραπείᾳ. Dr. Müller's objection is to the *θεραπεία* with which this sentence ends. The preceding *θεραπείας* is virtually defined by the words πάντων . . . θεῶν, though the clause actually goes with the following ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, and Dr. Müller admits (p. 15) that the word would even be unobjectionable if the πάντων . . . θεῶν clause were absent. That is, he would concede that *θεραπείας* means only 'tendance'; 'we may fairly expect that they will be better tended by Greeks'. But the defining genitive, he says, 'is necessary in the later place, unless one is prepared to assume that *θεραπεία* has already a religious sense', that is, I presume, to assume that it means 'worship'. But why should not *θεραπεία*, like the preceding *θεραπείας*, mean just 'tendance'? The nature of the tendance meant is doubly defined, first by the context, which shows that the recipients of it are the *gods* who have been specified on the first occasion of the occurrence of the word, again by the words τῇ κατὰ νόμους. The thought is thus that we may fairly expect that, under the guidance of education, the Delphic oracle, and the legally established *tendance*, the gods in question will be honoured by Greeks with a *tendance* nobler than that of which traditions reach us from the Orientals. Neither *θεραπείας* nor *θεραπεία* need be taken in the impossible sense 'divine worship'; in both cases the nature of the *θεραπεία* is sufficiently defined by neighbouring words. To admit this for *θεραπείας* but deny it for the following *θεραπεία* should be possible only to a critic who has made up his mind before investigation that the

Epinomis is not Plato's, and holds that 'any stick is good enough to beat a dog with'. Since one is said *θεραπεύειν θεούς*, where is the difficulty of saying, a little more verbosely, *θεῶν τῇ κατὰ νόμους θεραπείᾳ ἐπιμελείσθαι*?

ἀναπνοή is declared un-Platonic in the expression (*Epin.* 974 a 3) *ἀναπνοὴν δοκεῖ ποιεῖν τινα κατὰ μέσον πῆ βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον*, 'makes a short breathing-space in mid-life', on the ground that Plato always uses *ἀναπνοή*, 'either in its primary physiological sense, or in such a way that the physiological side of a situation is presented directly and pictorially', whereas, in the words just quoted, *alles bildhaft gesehene Physiologische fehlt* (p. 15). Is there really any recognizable distinction between the use of the word here and at *Phaedrus* 251 e 4—quoted by Dr. Müller—*ἰδοῦσα δὲ καὶ ἐποχουσα μὲν ἡμερον ἔλυσε μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα κέντρων τε καὶ ὠδίνων ἔληξεν*? In both cases the metaphor is that of a 'breathing-space' between two periods of tension and stress. In the *Phaedrus*, the lover in present converse with his beloved is said to have an interval of 'rest' between two paroxysms of yearning and passion; in the *Epinomis* the man who has come to mid-life to have a time of quiet between the more disturbing periods of growth to his *ἀκμή* and decline from it. In both cases the metaphor of the climber who stops to take breath is equally pat, and if the 'thing seen' is less vividly seen in the second case than in the first, that is a difference in keeping with the difference in the whole *ethos* of the two dialogues, and the interval between the periods of life at which, if Plato is the author of both, they must have been composed. Can no metaphor come from Plato, unless it has the vividness characteristic of the one passage in Plato which stands out conspicuously by its exceptional 'intensity', and is marked as exceptional by Plato himself? One might as well say that no metaphor can be from the hand of Shakespeare unless it has all the passionate intensity of Macbeth in his moments of extremest agitation. The actual word *ἀναπνοή* occurs nowhere in Plato but in these two passages, except in the *Timaeus*,

where it means literally 'respiration', and in one place (*Tim.* 91 b 2), a 'breathing-hole', *spiraculum*. The reasoning thus reduces to this: in a passage in the *Phaedrus* where Socrates is speaking, as he professes, under an extraordinary divine *afflatus*, ἀναπνοή is used metaphorically as part of a very vivid picture; therefore, a second passage where the same metaphor is used in a quieter picture, cannot be Platonic. *Nego consequentiam*.

νομοθέτης, νομοθετεῖν. Plato uses these words in *übertragener Bedeutung*, but only in their strict and proper signification (p. 16). Now in the *Epinomis* the appellation of the morning star as 'star of Aphrodite'—given here for the first time in extant Greek literature—is said to be something μάλα Συρίω νομοθέτη πρέπον (987 b 4), and at 987 a 7 we are told of the 'divine appellations of all the planets θαρροῦντα χρῆ τὰντα εἰς νόμους θέσθαι; finally, at 982 b 7 it is said of ψυχῆ that ἄρχουσα ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρχομένη νομοθετεῖ. May we not defend the first two of these passages by reflecting that a considerable part of the νόμος of an Hellenic city is actually concerned with the regulation of the worship of the θεοὶ οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει? Hence the planet-worship implied in the naming of the planets after various deities is naturally called the institution of an oriental νομοθέτης; and for the same reason the *Epinomis*, which advocates the adoption of the worship of the ψυχαί of these bodies in place of that of the 'all-too-human' Olympians, says we should give them a place in our 'laws'. (Of course, we cannot avoid doing so, if the planets are to have their 'holy days' in the State Calendar.) The phrase ψυχῆ νομοθετεῖ also seems to me unobjectionable when we remember that νόμος is νοῦ διανομή (*Laws*, 714 a 1), and that νοῦς can only exist in a ψυχῆ (*Tim.* 30 b 3). I see no *Übertragung* of the meaning of νόμος in these sentences; they are concerned with actual νόμοι, regulations of the cultus and studies of the society under contemplation.

μῦθος. *Epin.* 980 a 5 asks τίνες εἰσὶν ποτε καὶ ὅποσαι τινές (sc. σοφίαι), ἃς τις λαβὼν σοφὸς ἂν εἶη κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον μῦθον. It is complained (p. 16) that the word μῦθος is not used here,

'as always in Plato', with an implicit (*latent*) contrast with λόγος or ἀλήθεια. But cf. an exact parallel, *Laws*, 790 c 2-3 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὄνπερ ἤργμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνειν. In both places μῦθος is used, as in Ionic,¹ as an *equivalent* for λόγος. And cf. also *Eph.* vii. 344 d 3 τούτῳ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ τε καὶ πλάνῳ ὁ συνεπισπόμενος rightly rendered by H. Gomperz *wer nun dieser weitausholenden Darstellung gefolgt ist*; the μῦθος here means the preceding epistemological excursus (342 a 7-344 d 2) about the difficulties which beset the communication of philosophical truth.

μορφή. At *Epin.* 981 b 5, after being told that there are *five* types of regular solid, we hear that τὸ ἄλλο γένος ἅπαν ἔχει μορφήν μίαν, that is, 'the incorporeal' may all be brought under the one γένος, ψυχή. Whatever is ἀσώματον is a ψυχή. This is said to be un-Platonic language, since 'the word μορφή here no longer denotes "form" in *anschaulichem Sinne*, as always in Plato' (p. 17).

Always? In the argument of *Phaedo* 104 d odd (ἡ περιττή) and *even* (ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου) are the two contrasted μορφαί of number, and we have also the actual expression ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται to establish the equivalence of the words μορφή and ἰδέα. I do not think Dr. Müller will argue that ἰδέα in Plato is a word which cannot be used of the incorporeal (or of ψυχή). So in *Philebus* 34 d 1 it is said that we need to inquire περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορφήν αὐτῆς, though a μορφή of ἡδονή is no more *anschaulich* than a μορφή of the ἀσώματον, or the ἰδέα of ψυχή of which we actually hear in the *Phaedrus* (246 a 3).

βάρος. 'βάρος ist bei Platon die innere Schwere . . . dagegen die äussere Last ἄχθος oder ὄγκος' (p. 17). But the distinction is neglected at *Epin.* 988 d 3 οὐδ' ἡμῖν ἀπιστεῖ ψυχὴ κατὰ λόγον οὐδένα ὡς βάρος οὐδὲν περιφέρειν δυναμένη, where the βάρος means the weight of the body which the soul is said to cause to revolve. I think, if I may say so

¹ And in the diction of Attic tragedy, which the *Laws* sometimes recalls.

respectfully, that the criticism rests on an actual mistranslation. The words are being taken to mean that there is no ground to doubt the soul's ability to 'carry round' the 'burden' laid on it; this is why the critic says that the word *βάρος* should rather be *ὄγκον* or *ἄχθος*. I suggest, on the contrary, that the writer means precisely *weight*, the 'innere Schwere' of the associated body. The thought is not 'how can the soul carry about so heavy a load?' but 'how can it set such a *massive thing* revolving?' The difference is real, if subtle. (Not to say that I feel a little doubtful whether the alleged distinction really is made so absolute by Plato, when I remember that the *Cratylus* says (419c 6) that the word *ἀχθηδών* is 'obviously' *ἀπεικασμένον τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει*, a statement which implies the equation $\text{ἄχθος} = \text{βάρος}$.)

λόγος. The word is said (p. 17) to be used with a non-Platonic extension of meaning at *Epin.* 986c 4, in the phrase *κόσμον ὃν ἔταξεν λόγος ὁ πάντων θεϊότατος ὄρατόν*. Dr. Müller holds that Plato would have said *λογισμός*, or else *νοῦς*. So, no doubt he would, had he meant what Dr. Müller supposes, 'intellect'. But he is, in fact, speaking of the periodic movements of the heavenly bodies, and means *ratio*, and so says exactly what he means. Mr. Harward renders the words correctly, 'the universal order which *law* . . . has marshalled'. Cf. *Tim.* 36d 6 *ἀνομοίως, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ φερομένους*.

This completes the list of individual words unfavourably criticized, but for two which I have reserved to the last place. A complaint is made against the use of *σοφία* throughout the dialogue, on the ground that it is made to have an 'individualistic and religious sense' out of keeping with the spirit of the *Laws* (pp. 11-14), a charge which cannot be fully considered while we are dealing with purely 'lexical' peculiarities. More precisely, it is complained that the *Epinomis* directly connects with the twelfth book of the *Laws*, where the main question under consideration is what course of studies will conduct a man to *φρόνησις*; hence the problem of the *Epinomis* itself is announced at 973a as a consideration of *φρόνησις* and the means to it (*ἤκομεν . . . τὸ τῆς φρονήσεως*

ἐπισκεψόμενοι τίνι ποτὲ χρὴ λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν, ὃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἕξιν φαμέν, ὅταν διανοηθῆ, κάλλιστ' ἔχειν ποιεῖν πρὸς φρόνησιν ὄσσην δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ σχεῖν). But in the very next sentence, φρόνησις is replaced by σοφία, when the question is asked τί ποτε μαθὼν θνητὸς ἀνθρώπος σοφὸς ἂν εἴη, and the same prominence is given to σοφία throughout the sequel, though φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη are also mentioned. But in the *Laws* Plato 'abstains from' this 'pretentious concept' (σοφία), except when he uses the word ironically of an *opponent's* fancied σοφία. (The only exceptions to this rule are *Laws* 696 c 8 and the earlier passage there alluded to 689 d 7.) Further, in the *Epinomis* there is no absolute insistence on a connexion between σοφία and the political life of the 'city'; e.g. at 992 c 1 the possibility is contemplated that a man might practise σοφία without relation to politics (κεῖτε δημοσίᾳ τις ἐπιτηδεύσας ταῦτα εἴτε ἰδίᾳ διαβιῶ). 'The problem which the σοφία of the *Epinomis* has to solve is not the education of a stratum of leaders for the city of the *Laws*, but the delivery of the few individuals who are predestinated by their endowments from the burden of earthly existence' (p. 14).

Much of this criticism seems to me to rest on misunderstanding. It seems to be vitiated by the common tendency to read back into Plato the Aristotelian distinction, which, as Professor Burnet has shown, is wholly foreign to him, between σοφία and φρόνησις, words used by Plato throughout his dialogues indiscriminately for the 'virtues' of both 'speculative' and 'practical' intelligence. And we are surely missing the meaning even of the *Republic*—'political' as it is—if we do not understand that it is meant, besides preaching 'philosophy', as the foundation of statesmanship for an aristocracy of philosopher-kings, to commend it also as a guide in life and a medicine for the soul of every one who is capable of it, whether he is actually called to administer a state or not. It would be equally mistaken to suppose that the passionate refutations of religious unbeliefs in *Laws*, x, are intended to convince no one but the magistrates of the

community for which the Athenian professes to be legislating. If the *Epinomis* uses σοφία and φρόνησις as names for the same thing, and again if it conceives of that for which they are names as the rightful guide of the personal moral life, no less than of the career of the 'public man', it is, so far, in strict accordance with the whole teaching of Plato. Personal morality and personal religion were no secondary matters for the author of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, whatever they may be for some of his expositors. The one serious point in the whole of this criticism is thus, I should say, the verbal one that the words σοφός, σοφία are avoided in the *Laws*, in striking contrast to their prominence in the *Epinomis*.

We have to ask whether the contrast is quite as striking as the criticism represents it. Now in the *Epinomis* itself, the use of φρόνησις as equivalent to σοφία is not confined to the opening sentence. It recurs at 974*b* 3-4, where we actually have the expression φεύγει τότε ὅταν τις πρὸς τινα φρόνησιν ἴη τῶν λεγομένων τεχνῶν ἢ φρονήσεων. So at 974*c* 4 we have τῶν ὅσοι ἐν ἡμῖν δυνατοὶ γίνονται φρονίμως αὐτοὺς ἄλλους τε ἐξετάσαι. So we have φρονήσεως (977*a* 2), φρόνησιν (*ib.* *b* 5) with special reference to knowledge of *number*, and φρόνιμοι in the same context just below at 977*c* 2. At 982*b* 2, 4, the regularity of the motions of a heavenly body are said to show that it is φρόνιμον and ζῆ φρονίμως; ἔμφρον occurs in the sense of 'intelligent' immediately below, 982*d* 6, *e* 2, as well as later (983*d* 5). At 985*a* 1 the assumed denizens of ether and air are μετέχοντα φρονήσεως θαυμαστῆς, and God himself is declared to 'partake' τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν (985*a* 7). At 986*d* 2 the wise and virtuous astronomer is described as μεταλαβὼν φρονήσεως εἰς ἃν μιᾶς; at 987*a* 8 it is σαφῶς οὐκ ἔμφρόνων to think that the State's Calendar can afford to pass over any of τὰ θεῖα (whereas at *ib.* *c* 1-2 correct knowledge of the planetary periods is ὄντως οὐσα σοφία). The divinity would be (988*b* 4) πάντων ἀφρονέστατον if he did not know that numeration is something he himself teaches us. Under our proposed regulations the men

of greatest natural gifts, who have been educated in the right way, will be able to confer a supreme benefit *on the city* by controlling the 'more numerous and worse' τῶ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ (989 c 5). φρόνησις, then, can hardly be said to have fallen into the background in the *Epinomis*; it figures fairly frequently as an equivalent to what is also called σοφία and ἐπιστήμη, as it does in the Platonic dialogues generally. If we are told that the acquisition of this σοφία or φρόνησις will secure its possessor a happy life and a good death, that is no more than we have often heard from Plato, and we *are* told also, as I have indicated, that it will enable him to be the supreme benefactor of the community.

Thus Dr. Müller's criticism, as it seems to me, reduces to the one point that σοφία, not often mentioned in the *Laws*—*never*, he says, in the last third of the book—is a frequently recurring word in the *Epinomis*. But what else, I would ask, should we expect in any case? We do not expect frequent mention of 'science' in those parts of the *Laws* which are specially concerned with the discussion of the use of wine or the training of young people in dance and song, the appointment of various boards of magistrates and their respective duties, the penalties for various offences, or the like. There are hardly any sections of the *Laws* where there would be much occasion to dwell on 'science', except possibly the discussion of education in schools in Book vii, and the outline of natural theology in Book x. And even here, we must remember, we are treating of a general education for all citizens, and a simple theology which the wise men of the community must be able to defend by arguments capable of persuading the heretical or sceptical of the error of their ways. We should hardly expect to hear much of 'science' until we come to the question raised at 965 b 1, within five pages of the end of the book, how the members of the 'nocturnal council,' the brain of our society, are to be educated. It is just in the *Epinomis*, which provides the answer to that question, that we should expect

references to σοφία to become especially prominent, since a σοφός always means to the Greek mind one who knows something which men in general do not know. And what we should so naturally expect is exactly what we find. We should not, in any case, expect to find the words σοφός, σοφία, recurring in the *Laws* as frequently as in other dialogues. We can see for ourselves that they had been the 'catch-words of the day' in the circles in which most of the Platonic 'conversations of Socrates' are feigned to take place, but we can hardly suppose that they would be words charged with agreeable associations to such interlocutors as Megillus and Clinias. They are unavoidable if we are to discuss the necessity of having our statesmen highly trained in mathematics and astronomy, but we can well understand that the Athenian speaker is not anxious to obtrude them without necessity. There is a real difficulty which arises out of the situation, the difficulty of believing that Megillus and Clinias could have been parties to a discussion of the importance of advanced 'science'. This difficulty Plato created for himself when he planned the structure of the *Laws*. To be true to his own convictions, he must end his treatise with the demand that the 'nocturnal council' shall be familiar with these sciences, and must explain why. It is hard to imagine the two old men staying to the end of his discourse on such a topic, but it has to be imagined. The improbability is not created by the *Epinomis*, but is inherent in the plan of the *Laws* itself, just as it is inherent in the plan of the *Republic* that Thrasymachus should be an interested and unprotesting listener to the things Socrates says in the eighth and ninth books of the *Republic*, though it is hard to believe anything of the kind.

But it is hardly true that the words σοφός and σοφία are avoided in the *Laws* as completely as Dr. Müller asserts. At 640 d 4 the demand that convivial parties shall be presided over by one who does not abandon himself to the merriment but remains φρόνιμος (640 c 9) is immediately repeated in the form νήφοντά τε καὶ σοφὸν ἄρχοντα μεθύοντων

δεῖ καθιστάναί. For other examples of the words used without any touch of irony cf. 677 c 4-6 εἴ τε τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαίως ἠύρημένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἑτέρας; 689 d 2 τοὺς δὲ τοῦναντίον ἔχοντας τούτων ὡς σοφοὺς προσρητέον;¹ 691 a 6 οὔσα ἀμαθία μεγίστη δοκοῦσα δὲ σοφία; b 3-4 νῦν μὲν οὐδὲν σοφὸν γνῶναι . . . εἰ δὲ προῖδεῖν ἦν τότε, σοφώτερος ἂν ἦν ἡμῶν ὁ προῖδών (with its echo 692 c 1 νῦν μὲν γενόμενον οὐδὲν σοφόν); 732 a 6 τὴν ἀμαθίαν τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖν σοφίαν εἶναι;¹ 747 c 2 τὴν καλουμένην ἂν τις πανουργίαν ἀντὶ σοφίας ἀπεργασάμενος λάθοι; 752 b 11 δῆλον δὲ τό γε τοσοῦτον . . . καὶ τῷ μὴ πάνυ σοφῷ; 761 d 3 ἱατροῦ δέξιμ μὴ πάνυ σοφοῦ βελτίονα συχνῶ; 776 e 6 ὁ σοφώτατος τῶν ποιητῶν;¹ 902 e 7 τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὄντα σοφώτατον; 953 d 2 ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας.²

On the whole, then, the real facts about the words *φρόνησις*, *φρόνιμος*, *σοφία*, *σοφός* seem to me to stand thus. In both *Laws* and *Epinomis* the first two are freely used as in the Platonic dialogues generally, to cover both what Aristotle regards as the speculative and the practical 'excellences of intellect'; *σοφία* is used from time to time in the *Laws*, though not very frequently, as an equivalent of *φρόνησις* in this wide Platonic sense; in the *Epinomis* it is common, alternating with *φρόνησις*, as a name for the 'studies' or 'sciences' on which *Laws* xii insisted as specially requisite as qualifications for membership of the 'nocturnal council'. Thus it is *on its way*, but no more than on its way, to the special sense it has with Aristotle; in other words, *σοφία* is acquiring special associations due to the existence of the Platonic Academy with its organized curriculum of studies. I can see nothing in these facts, impartially stated, inconsistent with believing that the *Epinomis* is the last utterance of the aged Plato himself.

πιστεύειν. Objection is taken to the words (*Epin.* 980 c 2)

¹ In neither of these passages can there fairly be said to be any irony in the words.

² The 'rich and wise' are the citizens of our state, who are 'rich' in virtue and wisdom.

πιστεύσας τοῖς θεοῖς εὖχου τε καὶ λέγε τὸν ἐπιόντα σοι λόγον. 'The intellectual sense which πιστεύειν has in Plato—it is regularly related, or can be related, to a *sachliches Objekt*—has undergone a transformation *ins Religiöse*' (pp. 15–16). I am not sure precisely how Dr. Müller construes the sentence, though I suspect that he means that τοῖς θεοῖς is to be taken with πιστεύσας alone, in the sense 'with trust in the gods', and that such a use of πιστεύειν is unusual in Plato. So I think it is, but the expression is made easier by the possibility of taking the dative with εὖχον, and the πιστεύσας absolutely, 'make your prayer and discourse with good courage', or at least treating the τοῖς θεοῖς as to be taken ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with both πιστεύσας and εὖχον. As against what seems to be meant by the remark about Plato's habitual use of the word—viz. that it means, or can always be taken to mean, 'credo quod', cf. *Cratylus*, 399 a 1 τῇ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπιπνοία πιστεύεις, 'you trust to' it, *Laws*, 742 c 3 (μηδὲ νόμισμα παρακατατίθεσθαι) ὄφρ μή τις πιστεύει, 'except with a man whom one trusts', 915 e 3 πιστεύων πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἀλλάττηται ποιείτω ταῦτα κτλ, 'let him act trusting in the other party to the transaction'. Clearly we cannot say—if that is what Dr. Müller means—that πιστεύω in Plato *always* means to believe that something is so, to 'take a man's word for it that', and the like, never to put confidence, or faith, in something or some one, and the objection thus, I think, ceases to be of any weight.

III

It is only fair to remark that Dr. Müller himself does not rest his case chiefly on these alleged peculiarities in the use of single words. He attaches more importance to combinations of words which he thinks out of keeping with Platonic usage. I proceed to examine his examples.

975 c 7. μαντική, we are told, τὸ λεγόμενον οἶδεν μόνον, εἶδ' ἀληθές, οὐκ ἔμαθεν, 'only knows what the words of an oracular utterance are, but not whether they are true'. It is complained that Plato, in two places where he makes the same point (*Apol.* 22 c 2, *Meno*, 99 d 5), puts it in the form that

μάντεϊς 'say' a thing, but do not 'know' what they say. The fact is so, but Dr. Müller has overlooked the point that in the *Epinomis* the subject of the sentence is not ἡ μαντική but ἡ μαντική καὶ ἡ ἐρμηνευτική, and it would not be true to say of the ἐρμηνεύς what the *Apoloogy* says of the θεόμαντις, that he says something but does not know what he says; the ἐρμηνεύς does not 'say' the λεγόμενον, he interprets it, and he *does* know something, he knows what the λεγόμενον is. Hence the contrast between 'saying' and 'knowing' would not have been appropriate here; we *need* the contrast between knowing what the λεγόμενον is and knowing whether it is true.

977 c 5. The phrase not to know 'odd or even' (μήδε περιττὸν μηδὲ ἄρτιον) is said to be un-Platonic, because in the *Laws*, 818 c 4, the same thought is expressed rather differently (μήτε ἐν μήτε δύο μήτε τρία μήθ' ὅλως ἄρτια καὶ περιττὰ δυνάμενος γιγνώσκειν, where our dialogue says ζῶον ὅτι μὴ γιγνώσκει δύο καὶ τρία μηδὲ περιττὸν μηδὲ ἄρτιον). That καί is replaced by μήδε proves (!) 'that the writer of the *Epinomis* did not see that the notions odd and even are necessarily complementary' (p. 18). But at this rate, 981 c 4 ἐν περιτταῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίαις ἅμα μεταβολαῖς should 'prove' that he *did* see the same point. Really nothing is proved at all by such a trifling variation of phrase except the flimsiness of the grounds which will satisfy a critic who comes to judgment with his mind already made up.

975 d 2. παιδιά τις . . . οὐδαμῆ σπουδαία. The phrase shows the mindlessness of a writer who has not discovered that παιδιά and σπουδή are mutually exclusive. To Plato it was impossible to say such a thing because for him παιδιά gets its 'conceptual character' from the contrast with σπουδή, so that to say that a παιδιά is not σπουδαία is superfluous (p. 18).

Since we have heard at *Tim.* 59 d 1 of μέτριος παιδιά καὶ φρόνιμος, at *Laws*, 769 a 1 of ἡ πρεσβυτῶν ἔμφρων παιδιά, and at *Ep.* vi. 323 d 1 of an oath to be taken σπουδῆ τε ἅμα μὴ ἀμούσῳ καὶ τῇ τῆς σπουδῆς ἀδελφῇ παιδιᾷ, I do not think we can say that Plato would have shrunk from saying that

there are *παιδιαί* which can fairly be called, in spite of the apparent paradox, *σπουδαῖαι*, and others which cannot.

Epin. 985 *b* 1 ff. The various orders of *δαίμονες* are here said to act as interpreters and messengers to the gods and to one another, *ἐρμηνεύεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τοὺς ἀκροτάτους θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάντα*. This is 'un-Platonic' because (a) the middle voice of the verb occurs nowhere else in Plato, (b) in the famous passage about the *δαίμονες* as *ἐρμηνῆς* in *Symp.* 202 *e*, nothing is said of their acting in this capacity *πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. This 'shows' that the author has not grasped Plato's *anschauliche Vorstellung* of the *ἐρμηνεύς* 'who does his office without personal interest' (p. 19). Really? The *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* is rightly inserted, because in the *Epinomis* there is a detail unknown to the *Symposium*. The *δαίμονες* of water, air, ether form an ascending hierarchy; a message from earth therefore has to pass up the ranks from one official to a superior, before it reaches the supreme dignitaries, the 'highest gods'. The *πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, which gives us a picture of this procedure, makes the language more, not less, *anschaulich*. The use of the middle voice of *ἐρμηνεύειν* seems unusual, but not more so than a good many peculiarities of the diction of the *Laws*. I doubt if Dr. Müller himself really attaches much importance to it.

ζητεῖν. 'The verb is always joined by Plato to an accusative.' Therefore it is un-Platonic to say (*Epin.* 979 *b* 3) *ἡμῶν δ' οὖν ζητοῦσιν περὶ νόμων*. But cf. *Tim.* 47 *a* 7 *περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν*; *Polit.* 266 *d* 5 *ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν ζητήσει*. *ζήτησις περὶ* surely implies *ζητεῖν περὶ*, and absolutely upsets the allegation that it is un-Platonic to use *ζητεῖν* in the colourless sense of *διαλέγεσθαι*¹ (p. 19).

ἀποτίκτειν. *Epin.* 981 *a* 8 says that we have a *ζῶον, ὅταν μία συνελθοῦσα σύστασις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀποτέκη μίαν μορφήν*, 'when body and soul combine in the production of one *μορφή*' (viz. the *συναμφότερον*, or complex, 'living organ-

¹ And *διαλέγεσθαι* is not 'colourless' when we remember the omnipresence in Plato of the metaphor of the 'conversation of the soul with itself'.

ism'). It is objected that Plato would probably have avoided the 'picture', because it makes the 'begetters' components of the 'begotten', and that if he had used the phrase at all, *allensfalls* he would have said *γεννήση*. But how do we know this? *ἀποτίκτειν* is a word peculiar to Plato's later vocabulary. It apparently occurs, apart from the present passage, only twice in the *Theaetetus* and once in the *Timaeus*. At an earlier time he presumably would have written *γεννᾶν*, but the use of *ἀποτίκτειν* would be in keeping, in a work of his old age, with the employment of the same word in these two dialogues. As to the complaint brought against the metaphor, it might be urged with equal force against the statement of *Tim.* 54e 2 about the 'generation' of the equilateral triangle from six of the elementary triangles of that dialogue, *ἐν ἰσόπλευρον τρίγωνον ἐξ ἕξ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντων γέγονεν*. Here, too, an objector bent on cavilling might say the 'generators' are made components of the generated. A minor complaint is made that the phrase *συνελθοῦσα σύστασις* is objectionable (I suppose because you cannot picture the same thing at once as *ἰόν* and as *ἐστός*?). But the phrase is a simple and legitimate equivalent of *ψυχῇ καὶ σῶμα εἰς μίαν σύστασιν* (or more briefly *εἰς ἓν*) *συνελθόντε* and should offend no one of judgement. It is an even more captious complaint that at 990 b 8 the speaker expresses the sense 'to avoid needless repetition' by saying *ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις ταῦτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν διαλεγώμεθα* when he *might* have used the uncompounded *λέγωμεν* (much as at *Rep.* 558 d 8 Socrates says *ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα*, where the same criticism is equally appropriate or inappropriate).¹

ἀπεικάζειν. In *Ajt's lexicon*, s.v. *ἀπεικάζειν*, the sense *sich vorstellen* is accepted for three passages in the *Epinomis* and no others in the Platonic *corpus*. In two out of the three passages (980 a 9, 980 c 8, 9) I should myself take the verb rather in the sense, common in Plato, *effingere, describere*, and I suppose Dr. Müller would agree, as he makes no reference

¹ For the accus. cf. *Theaetet.* 158 c 5 *ἀννὶ διειλέγεμεθα*; 142 c 8 *τοὺς λόγους οὕς διελέχθη*.

to these passages. He does, however, use the third passage, 985 *b* 5, as proof that Platonic words are *verblasst* in the *Epinomis*. The actual phrase is τὸ δὲ ὕδατος πέμπτου ὄν ἡμίθεον μὲν ἀπεικάσειεν ἂν τις ὀρθῶς ἀπεικάζων ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγόνεναι, which may, no doubt, be rendered that 'we should do well to imagine' a semi-divine being made of water, as the denizen of that 'element' (an *Undine*, to use Goethe's word). But exactly in the same way, we might render οὐ κακῶς ἀπήκασας, *Parm.* 128 *e* 4, 'your conjecture was no bad one', or even—though with some loss of meaning—*Symp.* 221 *c* 6 οἶος γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἂν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ ἄλλους, 'one can imagine Brasidas and others as like Achilles'. The *Parmenides* passage seems a pretty exact parallel to our own; in both cases, I should say, the precise meaning is *verbis effingere*, though the metaphor is nearly obliterated in both places. But if Dr. Müller will let nothing pass for Platonic in which the metaphors have not the vividness of the 'iridescent' passages of the *Phaedrus*, he may safely athetize at least all the later Platonic dialogues.

One would have thought the phrase (973 *c* 3) ἔπου δὴ καὶ σὺνιδε ἂν σοι δοκῶ καγὼ . . . καλῶς τοῦ τοιοῦτου περὶ λέγειν unsuspecting. But its *unanschaulich* character, by contrast with the lively use of the metaphors at *Rep.* 432 *c*, is made evidence of spuriousness. And what of *Tim.* 53 *c* 1 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπεὶ μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παιδευσιν ὀδῶν δι' ὧν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα ἀνάγκη, συνέψεσθε. This is almost as unlike the vividness of the passage in the *Republic* as the words of the *Epinomis*. A man does not write at eighty with the same freshness as at forty or earlier. But Dr. Müller is still under thirty, and perhaps cannot be expected to understand this. I enumerate a few other criticisms of this kind, all turning on the alleged impossibility that Plato could have written anything wanting in *Anschaulichkeit*. It is *unmöglich* that he could say (977 *b* 3) ἀκολουθείτω ὄπη ποικίλλων αὐτὸν . . . ὄρας τε καὶ τροφήν πᾶσιν παρέχεται (sc. ὁ οὐρανός); or 990 *b* 5 σελήνη μὲν περίοδον τὴν αὐτῆς τάχιστα διέξεισιν; or 992 *b* 3 ὅτε θανάτω τις . . . τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει; or 977 *b* 9

σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πῶς τοῖς λόγοις. I am not clear where the *geringere Anschaulichkeit* (p. 20) is supposed to come in in these phrases; the objection to *περίοδον διεξιέναι* seems to be that a *περίοδος* is not a transit, to judge from the remark that elsewhere we have *ὄδον διεξιέναι* but *περίοδον πορεύεσθαι*. But a period can surely be said to be 'completed' or 'traversed' intelligibly enough, and if there is any confusion in the mental picture, it has a parallel in *Laws*, 716 a 1-2, where it is said of God that *εὐθεία περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος*, 'he keeps straight on right round the whole circuit'; as for the assertions that Plato could not say *ἀναπλήθειν τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν* or *ἐπανιέναι τοῖς λόγοις*, because he happens elsewhere to have said *μοῖραν ἐμπιμπλάναι* and *ἐπανέρχεσθαι τοὺς λόγους*, any one can easily make any number of such assertions, but why should they be supposed to have any profative force? And why is it *gewiss* that Plato could not have formed comparatives from *ἀμετάστροφος* and *θεοειδής* if he had wished? 6/

Exception is next taken to the expressions *δόσιν δεξάμενος* (977 b 7) and *μιμῶνται μιμήμασι* (975 d 4). The point seems to be that *δόσις* should mean the *act* of bestowing, not the thing bestowed, but *μιμήματα* the copies, not the processes of copying, so that our author confuses the significations of verbal nouns in *-σις* and *-μα*. But we have at least one clear example in a late Platonic dialogue of *δόσις* in the sense of *δῶρον* or *δωρέα*, *Phileb.* 16 c 5, where the science of number is called *θεῶν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσιν*, and it is said that it *ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη*. Hence I do not see why Plato might not say that men have received *τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσιν*. As to the *μιμήμασι* of 975 d 5, the objection taken seems even more fanciful. The complete phrase is that men imitate partly by the use of *ὄργανα*, partly *αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων οὐ πάντως εὐσχήμοσι μιμήμασιν*, i.e. by not wholly seemly bodily gestures and poses. Since in this second case contortions and poses of the body are at once the machinery by which the 'imitating is done and the result achieved, I do not see that the use of the word *μιμήμασιν* is out of place,

even if we insist on making the distinction between *μίμησις* and *μίμημα* absolutely rigid. (Thus a name is called a *μίμημα* more than once in the *Cratylus*, but obviously on the mimetic theory of language, the uttered name is also the *μίμησις*.) Besides, the theoretical distinction between words in *-σις* and words in *-μα* is notoriously not absolutely rigid in practice. To take only the most obvious examples, *ὄψις* and *ὄρασις*, both can mean not only the act of seeing, or that with which we see, but also, like *vision* in English, the thing seen, and *ὄψις* is used by Plato in both senses; so *σύστασις* means, like our English *composition*, both the bringing of two factors together, and the result of bringing them together. Indeed, there are two passages in the *Laws* in which a much more strained sense is put on the actual word *μίμημα*, 668 b 1–2 *ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι*, where *μιμήματι* can hardly mean anything but the *original*, the thing imitated, and 669 e 4 *καὶ ὅτῳ ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων*¹ (see Ritter and England in their commentaries on these passages).

Epin. 975 a 2 *πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτάς, σχεδὸν ὅσοις ἀγῶν πρόκειται τοῦ δοκεῖν ὡς ἄριστον ἄνδρα συμβῆναι γενόμενον ἄν*: 986 c 6 *ἔπειτα δὲ ἔρωτα ἔσχευε τοῦ καταμαθεῖν ὅποσα θνητῇ φύσει δυνατά*. These phrases 'are un-Platonic' for (pp. 20–1) Plato never conjoins *ἀγῶν* or *ἔρωσ* with an infinitive in this way; also *ἔρωτα σχεῖν* is objectionable, for in Plato, 'when the object of *ἔρωσ* is the 'bearer of a spiritual value', the object in question, as well as the *ἔρωσ* itself, appear as personal magnitudes' (p. 21). As to *ἀγῶν*, the objection is refuted at once by the familiar *μέγας ὁ ἀγῶν, . . . οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι*, unless it is meant that the article prefixed there to the infinitive is not in the genitive, so that the infinitive is appositional, not dependent. Whether a variation of this kind is a proof that it cannot be the same man who writes both *ἀγῶν, τὸ γενέσθαι* and *ἀγῶν τοῦ δοκεῖν* might

¹ The first of these passages *might* be explained differently, as by England, but the second seems to me to admit of no other interpretation, and the two, I think, stand or fall together.

fairly be doubted. Nor do I think any one but a critic who imagines that there are no words or phrases anywhere in the genuine dialogues which occur only once will base a confident argument on the fact that ἔρως τοῦ καταμαθεῖν has not an exact parallel elsewhere in Plato. The second argument I regret not to be able to understand. I do not see that ἔρως τοῦ καταμαθεῖν is, in any intelligible sense, more or less 'impersonal' than ἔρως τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, or ἔρως τοῦ βελτίστου βίου or ἔρως τούτου ὃ δεήσει γεγόμενον ἄνδρ' αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι, the three examples of genuine Platonic phraseology with which Dr. Müller confronts the phrase of the *Epinomis*.

But the *Epinomis* also 'personifies' φύσις and ψυχή in an 'un-Platonic' way (p. 21), for example in the phrases (990 b 1) πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρηῆσαι, (979 b 2) τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην αἰτιᾶσθαι χρὴ φύσιν, οὐκ ἐν δίκη διανεμούσαν τὸν αὐτῶν βίον, (982 b 7) ὅταν ψυχή τὸ ἄριστον κατὰ τὸν ἄριστον βουλεύσεται νοῦν, (989 b 3) ἐν ταῖς ἀρίσταις φύσεσιν, and others. Compare *Rep.* 359 c 5 ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν; 588 c 2 οἱ μυθολογοῦνται παλαιὰ γενέσθαι φύσεις; 576 a 5 ἐλευθερίας δὲ καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς τυραννικὴ φύσις αἰεὶ ἄγευστος; *Laws*, 875 a 2 φύσις ἀνθρώπων οὐδενὸς ἱκανὴ φύεται ὥστε γινῶναι; *Rep.* 519 c 8 ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον . . . τῶν οἰκιστῶν τὰς τε βελτίστας φύσεις ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα κτλ.; 365 a 6 τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, and a host of similar passages. Dr. Müller must be a very Lynceus if he can see any distinction between his incriminated quotations from the *Epinomis* and my random selection from the *Republic* and *Laws* in respect of 'personification' of φύσις and ψυχή.

The next grievance is that our author can speak of an ἀνθρωπίνη ἕξις (973 a 4) and that he uses the compounded epithet καλὸς κάγαθός not only of men, but of τροφή (975 b 2). For parallels justifying the expression ἀνθρωπίνη ἕξις,¹ if it needed any justification, cf. *Laws*, 713 c 6 ὡς ἀνθρωπεία

¹ The objection seems to be the use of the phrase as a periphrasis for ἀνθρωποι, like our 'humanity'.

φύσις οὐδεμία ἰκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα, μὴ οὐχ ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας μεστοῦσθαι; *Theaetet.* 149 c 1 ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὡς ἂν ἦ ἄπειρος, and for ἕξις equivalent in meaning to φύσις, 'natural condition', *Tim.* 42 d 1 εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἕξεως (meaning precisely εἰς ἀνθρώπου φύσιν); 66 c 2 οἰκεία τῇ τῆς γλώττης ἕξει (the structure of the tongue) πεφυκυῖα; *Rep.* 509 a 4 ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν. If any one holds that Plato 'could not' have spoken of τροφή as being καλὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ, I confess I cannot prove him wrong, but since the phrase occurs in the Platonic corpus, I see no good ground for doubting that Plato might as well have ventured it as another, until the *Epinomis* has been proved unauthentic by better arguments than any of those we have been examining.¹

The next attack is made on the 'un-Platonic personification' involved in the expressions πνεύματος ὄργην οὐδὲ φιλίαν (976 a 8) and προσφιλὲς ἀπάση κυβερνητικῇ. (In Plato only a Person can be *Träger der φιλία*.) For these expressions cf. *Symp.* 186 d 5 δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἔχθιστα ὄντα ἐν τῷ σώματι φίλα οἶόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν καὶ ἐρᾶν ἀλλήλων; *Sophist.* 242 c 9 τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἅττα πη, τότε δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐγγόνων παρέχεται; e 1 τὸ ὄν πολλά τε καὶ εἷς ἐστίν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλία συνέχεται. The passage about Empedocles and the other early cosmologists in the *Sophistes* and the speech of Eryximachus in the *Symposium*, in fact, must be spurious if Dr. Müller's theory that Plato never uses the words φιλία or ἔρως of anything but persons is to be rigorously maintained; if playful exceptions are to be allowed, this particular weapon can no longer be used to assail the *Epinomis*. (I note that the much despised author is incidentally credited with *inventing* the adverb φίλως (p. 22), a word which belongs to the vocabulary of Homer, Aeschylus, and Xenophon.)

¹ The argument, if it proves anything, would equally prove that the *Epinomis* is not even a fourth-century work, contrary to Dr. Müller's own thesis.

The next assault is on the use of *θεός*,—as we might expect from Dr. Müller's animus against what he is pleased to call *Religiosität*. The words of accusation are that 'Plato, who wrote the words (*Laws*, 716 c 4) ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῶν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἶη μάλιστα, could never have said ὃν δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦμαι, φράζειν χρή, καίπερ ἄτοπον ὄντα, καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ (*Epin.* 976 e 4). Why not, is more than we are told, except in the riddling remark that *es ist ein Mangel an innerer Distanz, der daraus spricht*, a saying which is wholly obscure to me. But as far as the words of our sentence go, they are not unlike something else I have read in Plato, τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν (*Tim.* 28c 3), and as for the sense, the speaker is on the point of developing the theory that Οὐρανός in particular is the 'god' from whom we have learned number, and that it has been his conscious purpose to teach it. I am not myself surprised that he should think that, to men like Clinias and Megillus, this idea will seem 'strange, and yet not so strange after all'. And I certainly see no incompatibility between saying that 'God is the true measure of all things' and saying that it is from watching the spectacle of the heavens that we have learned to count.

Dr. Müller's point becomes clearer when he passes to his next complaint. The writer, he says, may echo Platonic phrases, but he does not understand Plato's thought about God, man, and their relations. Plato in the *Laws* often speaks of human affairs as a παιδιά, but only speaks thus when he has the contrast of God and man in mind. He could never have said δισχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπονδάζων ἅμα (*Epin.* 992 b 2), or used such expressions as εἰ γὰρ σοι τοῦτο τέλος εἶη τῶν νόμων, θεοὺς προσπαίσαντι τιμᾶν (980 b 3), or οἷον παιδιᾷ καλῇ χρωμένῳ καὶ τιμῶντι θεοῦς (980 a 9). But I think Dr. Müller forgets that the προσπαίσαντι of his second example is glossed at once by the following clause (which he omits), ὕμνοις τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία γεραίροντι. An ὕμνος may fairly be called a παιδιά; it belongs to χορεία, and all χορεία is ἔμφρων παιδιά. Cf. *Laws*, 656 c 2 τὴν περι

τὰς Μούσας παιδείαν τε καὶ παιδιάν; 657 c 3 τὴν τῆ μουσικῆ καὶ τῆ παιδιᾷ μετὰ χορείας χρεῖαν ὀρθήν, and, for the words objected to in *Epin.* 992 b 2, *Ep.* vi. 323 d 1 σπουδῆ τε ἅμα μὴ ἀμούσῳ καὶ τῆ τῆς σπουδῆς ἀδελφῆ παιδιᾷ. The words of 980 b 2 follow close upon, and are justified by those of 980 a 9, so here, again, we are dealing with a mere cavil. I should say the same of the attack on the phrase of 975 b 6 οὐ γὰρ τέχνη ἀλλὰ φύσει κατὰ θεὸν πάντες φαινόμεθα γῆν μετακεχειρίσθαι, i.e. 'we have taken to cultivation at the prompting of a divinely implanted natural instinct'. Why the phrase φύσει κατὰ θεόν must imply a closer connexion between God and φύσις than the κατὰ θεὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν of *Laws*, 682 a 2, and therefore come from another hand (p. 23), is wholly dark to me.

We next learn that (p. 26) whereas Plato only uses the word *θεογονία* once (*Laws*, 886 c 3), and then of the theogonies of the poets, which he refuses to discuss, our writer, at 980 c 7 proposes to construct a *θεογονία καὶ ζωογονία* on sounder lines as a substitute for the faulty theogonies of the past. *Soit*, but what inconsistency is there between saying that it is irrelevant to the argument of *Laws* x to digress into a critique of the tales of Hesiod, and saying in the *Epinomis* that the principles of natural theology laid down in the *Laws* would enable us to make a better theogony than Hesiod's? It is strange that a critic should treat such trifles as proving a difference in outlook incompatible with common authorship.

There would be a real difference of this kind if it were true, as Dr. Müller says it is, that the interest of the writer of the *Epinomis* is directed *exclusively* [*italics mine*] to the world of becoming. But the only proof offered of this statement is that at 977 a 2 the question is asked, what god is it to whom we owe the gift of number, and the answer given is οὐρανός. This in no way proves what Dr. Müller wishes it should, that the writer regards *θεός* and οὐρανός as equivalent terms, a view which Dr. Müller rightly treats as un-Platonic. All that is proved is that the writer regards the

οὐρανός as a θεός, a being which may receive worship from the city. What he means by saying that we are indebted to this particular θεός for number is explained by himself, when he adds that arithmetic has been developed out of attempts to compute and compare the observed periods of the heavenly bodies. The passage should really be quoted as showing close parallelism with *Tim.* 47 a-b, where the same point is made at great length.

IV

It is not sufficient for Dr. Müller's purposes to establish the point—if he has established it—that there are differences between the diction of the *Epinomis* and the diction of Plato in his later years; it is further to be shown that the first is a conscious *imitation* of the second by an inferior hand, which cannot imitate without caricaturing. On the basis of Constantin Ritter's stylometrical studies, Dr. Müller lays it down that what is most of all characteristic of the diction of the later Platonic dialogues, especially of the *Laws*, is a certain *Intensivierung des Ausdrucks* (p. 29); it is to be shown that the *Epinomis* exaggerates this peculiarity in a way which can only be accounted for as conscious and unskilful imitation. For myself, I am not satisfied that the exaggeration, if fully proved, would submit of only this one explanation. It might be explained by advancing age, and failure of literary power, and this explanation is not excluded by the consideration that there are one or two allusions in the *Laws* themselves which prove that the text was not completed until a very few years before the writer's death. Failure of literary power is a process which may be very much accelerated within the last year or two, or even within the last months, of a long life; it need not proceed at a uniform rate. It would be possible for a falling-off which had been progressing only gradually between the years of seventy and eighty to be visibly and markedly exaggerated in the last months of life, especially if those months were characterized, as they sometimes are in men who have

preserved their vigour to a very advanced period, by sudden and rapid physical collapse at the extreme end. We do not know that there was any such collapse in Plato's case, but equally, in the absence of all definite information, we do not know that there was not. The latest writings of Plato to which we can ascribe any precise date are *Epp.* vii and viii, of which viii seems to presuppose that Callippus is no longer to be reckoned with as a factor in the Sicilian situation, and may therefore be dated, perhaps, as late as 352 B.C. (*Ep.* vi may conceivably be later still, but we seem to have no means of dating it exactly, and in any case, it is too short to be used as a basis for any confident calculations.) We are not in a position to say that the *Epinomis*, if written by Plato, may not have been composed in the six years or less between the writing of *Ep.* viii and the philosopher's death, nor yet that his literary power may not have failed him more markedly within that interval than during the whole of the preceding fifteen years. Hence I do not think that proof that the *Epinomis* exaggerates the stylistic peculiarities of the *Laws* would be enough to establish diversity of authorship; there would always be the alternative explanation that there may have been some interval between the completion of the *Laws* and the composition of the *Epinomis*, and that, within this interval, there had been an accelerated falling-off in the author's powers of expression.

We must, however, consider the detailed evidence offered us in proof of dependence which reveals exaggeration only to be accounted for by unskilful imitation. Some of this, I own, seems to me negligible. I do not believe that any one without strong antecedent bias would seriously argue (p. 30) that such expressions as *ὅστις νοῦν κέκτηται καὶ τὸν βραχύτατον* (985 c 7), or *ἐξ ἀπάσης ἀνάγκης* must be a clumsy imitator's exaggerations of the more familiar *ᾧ καὶ βραχὺς νοῦς ἐνείη* and *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, especially when we remember *Laws*, 689 d 4 *πῶς γὰρ ἂν . . . γένοιτ' ἂν φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος*; *Theaet.* 203 d 8 *προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπαντα ἀνάγκη*; *Laws*, 762 c 3 *πάσης τινὸς ἀνάγκης*

ἐπιπεσοῦσης; 920 *b* 5, ἐκ πολλῆς ἀνάγκης. So the use of the plural κτήσεις at 975 *a* 4 πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτὰς φεύγει διὰ τὰς κτήσεις τῆς φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεως, seems to me quite in keeping with the marked taste of Plato's latest dialogues for the plurals of feminine *abstracta*, even in cases where the singular would be possible, and would convey the meaning adequately. Though I should not like to be as sure as Dr. Müller professes to be that the plural here does not refer to 'a process which has to be repeated for each of several persons', as it does e.g. at *Politic.* 271 *e* 8. Dr. Müller thinks this impossible, because the grammatical subject of the sentence is πᾶς ἀνὴρ, *ein jeder*. But surely he has heard of *constructio ad sensum* in the course of his researches into the style of the *Laws*.

The use of *περ* (975 *c* 4) in the phrase πολλή *περ* καὶ τεχνικὴ γενονῦια is a much stranger thing in a piece of Attic prose, yet I do not know why it should be impossible in the author of a work which approximates to poetic diction as freely as the *Laws* sometimes does. The collective use of the singular ζῶον in the phrases τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶον, 'the species of animals which include ourselves' (982 *b* 1), and ζῶον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 'the human animals' (976 *d* 8), is certainly a little curious, but I can see no reason to regard the expression γῆν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, 'to work the soil' (975 *b* 7), as a sort of artificial heightening of γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι, when I remember how common the word μεταχειρίζεσθαι, in the sense to 'handle' material of any kind is, throughout the dialogues. I am still less impressed by such criticisms as that our writer uses the compounds μεταβουλεύεσθαι (982 *d* 1) and συμπλήρης (985 *b* 1), when he might have conveyed his meaning by the uncompounded βουλεύεσθαι and πλήρης. This is not even the fact with μεταβουλεύεσθαι, since the words μεταβουλεύομενον ἄνω καὶ κάτω mean 'changing one's plans at random', and the pleonasm of adding the ἄνω καὶ κάτω, as well as saying μετα-, is the kind of pleonasm which meets us everywhere in an author of the *facundia* and *cofia* of Plato. And I hardly think Dr. Müller really strengthens his case

by going back on his judicious opening observations to call attention to a few ἄπαξ λεγόμενα, which include such words as ὁμόδρομος, πανσέληνος, θεοσέβεια, and μακραιών. It will hardly be maintained that these words did not *exist* in the Greek language before the death of Plato; in fact we can *prove* that most of them did (e.g. μυριετής, πανσέληνος, μακραιών, πάγιος,¹ ἔσπερος, ὑετός, ἀέριος, ληίζεσθαι, ἐπίπαν, θεοσέβεια,² καθαριότης,² στερέμνιος, παρέξι).

πέποιθα is, as Dr. Müller says, a very rare word in Attic prose; still the very statement that one of the only two other passages of the classical period where it occurs is *Menex.* 248 a 7 makes it difficult to base any argument about authorship on its appearance at *Epin.* 974 b 7; since both in the *Menexenus* and at Thuc. ii. 42. 4 (the only other classical Attic instance of the word cited in the lexicons) the phrase is αὐτῷ πεποιθέναί, σφίσι αὐτοῖς πεποιθέναί, it does not seem natural to regard *Epin.* 974 b 7 τῆς ψυχῆς σφόδρα πεποιθίας as a conscious *imitation* by some one else of an unusual expression from the *Menexenus*.

Objection is taken to the use of the word ἀποτελευτᾶν at 984 d 2, where it is said that the hierarchy of ζῶα begins with the gods and ends at ourselves (εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποτελευτᾶν). The word 'in Plato always implies' the notion of ending in something essentially different from the starting-point. On Dr. Müller's own admission the word occurs in Plato only three times, apart from our present passage, twice in the *Protagoras* of pleasures which end in pain, or pains which end in pleasure, and once in *Politic.* 310 e 2, where the unduly 'shy' soul is said ἀποτελευτῶσα δὴ παντάπασιν ἀναπηροῦσθαι. This last passage seems to refute the assertion that Plato could not use the word *simply* with the meaning 'to end in'; even if it did not, three occurrences of

¹ For the adverb παγίως belongs to the vocabulary of Plato himself in *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, *Timaeus*.

² At least these words are part of Xenophon's vocabulary, and no one will suggest that the *Anabasis* and *Memorabilia* are post-Platonic works.

the word in the whole Platonic *corpus* are a slender basis for an induction that it *bedeutet bei Platon immer* (p. 33) something more special. The corresponding noun ἀποτελεύτησις, in the phrase διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, used of the δόξα, or 'judgement', in which the 'discourse of the soul with itself' comes to an end, does seem to me to mean *einfach das Schlussglied einer kontinuierlichen Reihe*, though Dr. Müller says *ex cathedra* that it does not. For the matter of that, if Dr. Müller will have it that Plato cannot have written ἀποτελευτᾶν without meaning more than can be conveyed by the uncompounded τελευτᾶν, a series of ζῶα which begins with God and ends with men may not unfairly be said to end in *etwas wesentlich anderem*; there is always in Plato's thought a very real difference between God and 'us men'. Nor, again, do I see why the fact that Plato in the *Laws* (899 b 9) quotes the apophthegm traditionally ascribed to Thales in the form πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, proves that a writer who gives it (*Epin.* 991 d 4) as θεῶν πάντα πλέα must be an imitator who substitutes the more 'exquisite' word πλέα as more impressive. It is true that elsewhere πλέως is used by Plato only twice, in the *Republic* (391 c 4, 486 c 7), but for my own part I can see nothing in the context of either passage which makes *der gewähltere Ausdruck* specially apposite there. But there is, to my own feeling, a πάθος about the *Epinomis* paragraph to which the slightly poetical effect of the substitution of πλέα for the more usual πλήρη is distinctly appropriate.

Thus I do not see that any or all of the examples adduced sufficiently establish Dr. Müller's conclusion (p. 34) that the *Epinomis* contains a 'quantity of intensificatory expressions which exceeds the Platonic'. His next sentence, I suspect, betrays a real confusion of thought. We need not ask, he says, how far the writer 'is dependent on the language of his time' in this particular, or how far Plato himself 'is in advance of the language of his time, and how far he allows himself to be led by it'. There *seems* to be some suggestion here that there are two 'times' in question, that of Plato—that is, of the aged Plato who wrote the *Laws*—

and the time of Philippus, who, according to Dr. Müller, wrote the *Epinomis*. But Philippus was notoriously a personal disciple, *possibly* the actual secretary, of Plato in his last years, the reputed transcriber of the *Laws* for circulation; and the researches of Dr. Müller's own teacher, Professor Jaeger, seem to have made it reasonably certain that there is the closest connexion between the *Laws*, the *Epinomis*, and Aristotle's no longer extant *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*. Even on Professor Jaeger's assumption that the *Epinomis* is a *rejoinder* to the *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, itself called out by Plato's death, there can have been no interval of any serious length between the circulation of the earliest and the latest of the three, and I need not say that tradition knows nothing of any stage in the history of the Platonic text in which the *Laws* circulated without the *Epinomis*. Had they ever done so, it is hard to believe that doubts would not have been felt of the genuineness of the *Epinomis* from the first, though, as I have already remarked, it is plain that so well-read a Platonic scholar as Proclus, with the library of the Academy at his service, had never heard of such suspicions, since his arguments against the dialogue were, as we know, founded on very different grounds.¹ Any *theory about the authorship* of the *Epinomis* which requires us to make a serious distinction between the 'age' of its writer and the 'age' of Plato's latest years may fairly be said to put itself out of court.

It is next complained that the dialogue betrays itself by foolishly exaggerating the Platonic avoidance of *termini technici*. Thus it speaks of *στερεὰ σώματα* to avoid using the technicality *στοιχεῖα*, though Plato does not avoid that word. This is a particularly unfortunate criticism. *Of course* the *Epinomis* does not say *στοιχεῖα* when it means 'particles', or

¹ He urged two arguments, both bad: (1) Plato would not have gone on to write the *Epinomis* without giving a final revision to the *Laws*; (2) there is a disagreement between *Epin.* 987 b 6 and 'other dialogues' about the sense of the revolutions of the planets. This overlooks the point that the *Epinomis* agrees on this point with the convention laid down at *Laws*, 760 d 2. That is *why* it disagrees with, e.g., the *Timaeus*.

'solids'; it *has* to say στερεὰ σώματα for the good reason that no στερεὸν σῶμα or στερεὰ φύσις is a στοιχείον according to Plato. We are told at *Tim.* 48b 8 that the στερεὰ σώματα, popularly thought to be στοιχεῖα (the ABC of nature), are not even συλλαβαί. The στοιχεῖα of *Timaeus* are not *bodies*, they are two types of triangle, and when Aristotle talks of the στοιχεῖα in connexion with Plato, he means 'the one' and the ἀόριστος δυνάς. If the *Epinomis* had given the name στοιχεῖα to bodies, the single fact would have been conclusive, or all but conclusive, proof of its spuriousness.¹ Objection is also taken to the description (976e 2) of arithmetic as the ἐπιστήμη ἣ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα, which is regarded as another foolish attempt to avoid the technical name ἀριθμητική. But, in the context, the language is eminently proper. The speaker asks 'which of all the ἐπιστήμαι has done more than any other to develop man's intelligence?' and answers his own question by saying, 'that to which we owe number'. I maintain that this is a most natural turn of phrase, and that it is not used merely to avoid saying ἀριθμητική is proved by the occurrence of that word at 977e 2. It is part of the same objection that exception is taken to the harmless phrase ψυχὴ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμένη (989b 7). How, asks Dr. Müller, *could* Plato express himself so, when the sense would be given by saying ψυχὴ ἀνδρεία? I can only reply, 'Why should Plato *not* speak so?' Dr. Müller goes on to complain that, in the same context, the ψυχὴ which is being commended is called εὐκολος. This, he thinks, indicates the presence in the writer's thought of an *ethos* 'foreign to Plato' (p. 35). Is there, then, such a difference between the πρῶτος and the εὐκολος, and is not

¹ In fact, the very reason why the speaker in the incriminated passage (981b 3) is careful to say 'five solid bodies' is that the 'likely view' he has in mind is the theory that there are the same number of great cosmic masses of different character (earth, water, &c.) as there are 'regular solids', *five* of each and no more. He means expressly to remind us of the σχήματα Πλάτωνος, and his words are chosen with a view to that purpose. They could not have been chosen better.

πράοτης regularly mentioned by Plato as a part of a virtuous character? Cf. *Rep.* 329 *d* 4 ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὐκολοὶ ὦσι; 330 *a* 5 οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπεικῆς πλουτήσας εὐκόλος ποτ' ἂν ἐαντῶ γένοιτο, the meaning of the word being, as Ast says, *comis*, exactly as in the phrase of our dialogue.

975 *a* 5 ἔστω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς ἀλληλοφαγίας τῶν ζώων ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν, ὡς ὁ μῦθος ἐστίν, τὸ παράπαν ἀποστήσασα, τῶν δὲ εἰς τὴν νόμιμον ἐδωδὴν καταστήσασα. 'The whole sentence *proves* [italics mine] the author's incapacity to comprehend the word ἀλληλοφαγία in its component elements' (p. 37). The 'proof' is said to be the *Fortführung in den Doppelgliedern*, τῶν μὲν . . . τῶν δέ. But what is amiss here? The *first* μὲν is not actually answered in the sequel by a δέ, but is μὲν *solitarium* (not an uncommon thing in the *Laws*). The other two clauses seem to me to be quite naturally opposed. The thought is that the rule of civilized life has broken us wholly of feeding on the flesh of some creatures, and confined us to an orderly and refined consumption of the flesh of others. The one peculiarity of the sentence is that it opens as though we were to have ἡ τῆς ἀλληλοφαγίας ἡμᾶς ἀποστησάσα; the speaker then remembers that the rules of civilized life do not absolutely prohibit *all* flesh-eating. They absolutely prohibit the eating of some creatures; others they allow us to eat, but we must feed on them like gentlemen, not devour them, 'blood and bones', like wolves. This progressive breaking up of a notion into its component parts, as commonly in the *Laws*, leads to a slight *anacoluthon*, but if that is proof of non-Platonic authorship, we shall have to surrender much more of the Platonic *corpus* than the few pages of the *Epinomis*. The meaning is 'the rule which has broken us of feeding on the flesh of our fellow-animals, absolutely in the case of some, in the case of others confining us to a civilized consumption'. I adopt a rendering which fairly reproduces in English whatever surface irregularity there is in the Greek words, but I submit that my sentence is perfectly intelligible, and would not be alleged by any reasonable critic as proof of my inability to understand what is meant

by ἀλληλοφαγία. The ἀλληλοφαγία meant is that a carnivore will eat other creatures indiscriminately. A man will not eat some at all (and it is probably specially meant that he will, of course, in no case eat man); others he will eat only with due restraints.

Then follows a further assault on the clause εἰς τὴν νόμιμον ἐδωδὴν καταστήσασα. You may say καθιστάναι εἰς ἀπορίαν, εἰς ἀθυμίαν, and the like, and Plato does say these things. But to say καθιστάναι εἰς νόμιμον ἐδωδὴν proves lack of *Anschauungsvermögen*. It is the same want of *Anschaulichkeit* which leads the writer to speak (975 b 8) of ἡ τῶν οἰκήσεων συννυφή, though it is suggested that he may be copying *Critias* 116 b 4, where ὑφαινον is the verb used to describe the architects of Atlantis beautifying their buildings by using stones of several colours. I find it hard to follow this argument. The *Unanschaulichkeit* complained of seems to consist simply in speaking of the constructors of dwellings as 'weaving' them together. The *Critias*, I presume, is excused on the ground that it mentions the divers coloured stones as the constituents which are interwoven. But since the passage of the *Epinomis* is dealing with all 'arts' of 'interlacing' materials, and some οἰκήσεις are actually made by 'interlacing' wattles, and the like, I do not feel that there is an amount of difference which can fairly be used as evidence that *Epinomis* and *Critias* are the work of different authors. And what does Dr. Müller make of *Tim.* 69 a 6–8 ὅτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἶα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν ὑλὴ παράκειται τὰ τῶν αἰτίων γένη διωλισμένα. ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον δεῖ συνυφανθῆναι. Here are three processes, building, filtering, weaving, all worked into the same metaphor. Is this *Anschaulichkeit*? I should have thought that the prima facie probability is in favour of all three passages in which building and weaving are associated in this fashion being from one writer, and further that any lack of *Anschaulichkeit* shown by any of them is most naturally explained by the great age of the writer. One does not look for *Anschaulichkeit* in the language of a man of eighty. The *geringere sprachliche Kraft des Autors der*

Epinomis (p. 37) is quite compatible with the *Autor's* being Plato—at that age. Would any one deny that there is a visible failure of *sprachliche Kraft* in *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, or would any one allow this as a sufficient ground for ascribing the work to some inept obscure imitator of Goethe?

I attach no weight to Dr. Müller's concluding fling at the combinations λέγωμέν τε καὶ φῶμεν (986 b 8) and ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως (976 d 2). The second arouses Dr. Müller's wrath against a writer who is assumed not to know that ὄντως and εἰκότως are in Plato's language antithetical to one another. Not more so, are they, than γένεσις and οὐσία, and yet, who wrote the words ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μεικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν (*Phileb.* 27 b 8)? Plato has frequent occasion to contrast plausibility with truth, but is it to be supposed that he held that *no* statement whatever can be at once true and plausible?

V

Dr. Müller, as his language will have shown, regards the unauthenticity of the *Epinomis* as clearly proved by the peculiarities of diction we have been considering. But he offers us further confirmation of this conclusion to be got by turning from the verbal material of the dialogue to a study of its form; the form also is to be proved unworthy of Plato, and the attack is to be made, in the first instance, on strictly verbal form. The sentence-construction is to be proved to reveal the hand of an incompetent imitator of that which he does not understand. The method adopted is to select from the *Laws* typical examples of complex sentences with a visibly correct and perspicuous construction-pattern, and to set them in sharp contrast with less well-constructed sentences from the *Epinomis*. There seems to be something inevitably arbitrary and unfair about the whole of this procedure. It is true that the *Epinomis* is plentiful in sentences which are not visibly well-constructed, sentences with a perplexed and difficult pattern. It is also

true that in a work of the length of the *Laws*, it is not hard to find elaborate sentences in which the pattern is perspicuous, and that if one proceeds in this way, it produces a striking contrast-effect. But it is equally easy to make our selection from the *Laws* on different principles; one can easily find, if one looks for them, sentences which defy all attempts at reduction to a properly symmetrical pattern; if these are taken as the basis for comparison with the *Epinomis*, the contrast-effect is, to say the least, very much diminished. My feeling is that Dr. Müller's *parti pris* has led him to select from the *Laws*, as the basis for his verdict, only such sentences as will tell decidedly in favour of his case. He cites some exceedingly well-arranged sentences, but, quite unconsciously of course, completely passes over the ill-constructed ones. The result is that what he exhibits by way of contrast with the *Epinomis* cannot really be called a 'fair, average sample' of the *Laws*. Hence his method, as it seems to me, gives us no basis for deciding whether such inferiority as he finds in the *Epinomis* is due to unskilful imitation by a weakling, or to fatigue and rapidly approaching dissolution on the part of the aged writer of the *Laws* himself. And this is precisely the issue on which we want to make up our minds. And no account is taken of the possibility—in view of the character of our MSS. text, it might perhaps be called the overwhelming probability—that great allowance has to be made in both works for the likelihood that we are dealing with a text which has never undergone a final revision, and perhaps, as Burnet contends,¹ a text of which much has been dictated to an amanuensis by a thinker in extreme old age and bodily feebleness.

Since I regard this method of setting up a selected 'model sentence' from the *Laws* as the type of what the sentences of the *Epinomis* must be, if they come from Plato, as improperly arbitrary, I feel justified in passing without special comment over a number of phrases which are unfavourably

¹ *Platonism* (University of California Press, 1928), 81, 86.

criticized in this section of Dr. Müller's dissertation. But I invite any one who, like myself, has had occasion to work through several books of the *Laws* with students, calling their attention carefully to all that seems strange in its sentence-construction, whether, by dwelling on the odd and abnormal, it would not be easy to pile up as much 'proof' of this kind against the *Laws* as Dr. Müller accumulates against the *Epinomis*? The fact, I am sure, is that Dr. Müller has *started* with the assumption that 'every one knows' that Plato composed the *Laws*, and has therefore not looked for arguments for assigning the work to any one else, but has *begun* his examination of the *Epinomis* with a presupposed conclusion the other way, and then, as we say, gone through its pages 'with a tooth-comb' to discover evidence in support of what he began by assuming without evidence. He should ask himself whether he would find much difficulty in disposing of his own 'evidence', if he would set out from the opposite presumption, that it is *bekannt* that the *Epinomis* is Plato's, or even with a perfectly open mind on the question. *Of course*, if one begins with the assumption that *the writer is known not to be Plato*, things which would otherwise have given rise to no suspicion at once become 'confirmations strong as Holy Writ', just as used to be the case with the now universally acknowledged *Ep.* vii, when scholars read it habitually with the preformed conviction that 'all the world knows' that a letter purporting to be by Plato or Isocrates *must* be a forgery. Dr. Müller is a young scholar at the opening of his career, and I may therefore, without unseemliness, express my conviction that the history of his dissertation is that he has begun by taking the non-Platonic authorship of the *Epinomis* on trust from his teachers, and simply set himself to argue the case in the spirit of an able advocate 'briefed' for the 'prosecution'. As advocacy, his dissertation is industrious and efficient, but it must not be mistaken for the impartial decision of a judge who has dispassionately listened to the defence as well as to the prosecution. Like too many writers of such theses, Dr. Müller

has forgotten the advice Plato gives us in the *Parmenides*, to consider the consequences of the denial of a 'postulate' as well as those of its affirmation.¹

This substitution of advocacy for judgement seems to me very marked in the accumulation of examples alleged to prove that the writer could not construct a correct antithesis; he suffered from a habit of mind which made *Inkonzinnität* almost obligatory on him (p. 42). Thus exception is taken to so harmless a phrase as that of 974 d 3 ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαι μὲν εἰσιν λεγόμεναι, σοφὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀποτελοῦσι, where there is nothing to attack beyond a trifling and quite Platonic *hyperbaton* of the μὲν, the phrase being equivalent to ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαι λεγόμεναι μὲν εἰσιν κτλ. 982 e 4-6 is similarly attacked because the φύσις of the stars is there said to be ἰδεῖν μὲν καλλίστην, πορείαν δὲ καὶ χορείαν πάντων χορῶν καλλίστην . . . χορεύοντα πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ δέον ἀποτελεῖν, where there is no false antithesis whatever, and the only irregularity is just what might be expected in an unrevised first draught by a writer in advanced old age, like the numerous failures of strict grammatical sequence presented by the text of the *Laws*. A list is then given of examples of μὲν and δέ, where it is alleged there is no real antithesis in thought and where 'Plato', at least so Dr. Müller says, 'would only use a simple connective δέ' (p. 42). But the list which follows should be at least subjected to a considerable reduction. At *Epin.* 983 d 1 ff. it is unfair to take the μὲν of d 2 and the δέ of d 5 as a case of false antithesis. Restore the words Dr. Müller has omitted from his citation, or as much of them as is relevant, and the sentence runs πότερον ἔχει λόγον ὁ λόγος . . . τὸ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ὄντα εἶναι δύο, . . . καὶ τρίτον ἄλλο οὐδὲν κοινὸν οὐδενί, διαφέρειν δὲ ψυχὴν σώματος. I.e. we are to ask whether it is a 'true story that first of all τὰ ὄντα are of two kinds (viz. soul and body), and that there is no *tertium quid*, and that soul is superior to body'. The

¹ Suppose one chose to take such sentences as *Laws*, 887 c 7 φέρε δὴ-888 a 2 ὡς εἰσίν, or the like, as one's samples of the manner of the 'author of the *Laws*'?

δέ after διαφέρειν is not meant to mark an antithesis, the μέν after πρώτον is demanded by the πρώτον itself. The only peculiarity of the sentence, and it is really no peculiarity, is that the construction changes slightly, so that there is no formal 'secondly' to answer to the 'in the first place', and the μέν is thus left a μέν *solitarium*. Thus the effect is not so very unlike *Phileb.* 15 b 1 πρώτον μέν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας κτλ., where the absence of a δέ with the εἶτα leaves the μέν 'solitary'. So *Epin.* 986 e 7 ὡς μέν ὀνόματι φράζειν οὐκ ἔστιν διὰ τὸ μὴ γινγνώσκεισθαι, τούτου δ' αἴτιος ὁ πρῶτος ταῦτα κατιδὼν βάρβαρος ὢν is no false antithesis; 'I cannot give its name, for it has no known name, and the reason of this is that the first observer was a barbarian'. The μέν is once more a perfectly harmless μέν *solitarium*, the unexpressed thought being, 'but we know the planet meant, though we have not a name for it'. *Epin.* 987 c 3 ὦν εἰς μέν βραδυτῆτι διαφέρων αὐτῶν ἔστι, Κρόνου¹ δ' αὐτόν τινες ἐπωνυμίαν φθέγγονται· τὸν δὲ μετὰ τούτου βραδυτῆτι λέγειν χρὴ Διός. Here the μέν is correctly answered by the second δέ, the δέ in the previous clause means 'and', and the words, Κρόνου . . . φθέγγονται are inserted parenthetically without influencing the construction.

990 a 2 σχεδὸν μέν οὖν ἔστιν ἄτοπον ἀκούσαντι, τὸ δ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε κτλ., i.e. 'you will be surprised at the name I am going to use, still *my friends and I* do give this subject the name ἀστρονομία'. The name will surprise you (because its associations suggest Hesiod and his sailor's almanac), but it is *our* name for the science of the celestial motions. There is a real antithesis in thought between the associations of the word and the use to which it is being put, and the phrase therefore seems to me not seriously open to criticism.

979 a 2 δοκῶ μέν μείζονος ἔνεκα, καὶ τούτου δέ. Sc. 'I think he acted for this purpose among others, as well as for a wider end.' The antithesis, 'he had a further purpose, but this was certainly part of his intention', is *not* false.

¹ But one should pretty certainly read ἡλίου for Κρόνου with A and O

976 a 1. ἦν δὲ καλοῦσι μὲν ἰατρικὴν, βοήθεια δέ που καὶ αὐτή. That is, medicine has a name wholly unconnected with the art of war, which has just been mentioned, *but*, though the names are so unconnected, the arts are closely allied, each being a *βοήθεια*, an art of defence. The antithesis intended between the dissimilarity of the names and the similarity of the things named is obvious. Exactly similar is 990 d 1 ὃ καλοῦσι μὲν σφόδρα γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν, τῶν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοις φύσει ἀριθμῶν ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπιπέδων μοῖραν γεγονυῖα ἐστὶν διαφανής. 'They call it land-measuring . . . but it is a method of dealing with irrational numbers'. Here again the antithesis is sound and obvious; the science in question is a branch of arithmetic, though it has a misleading name.

Only one of Dr. Müller's horrid examples is still left unaccounted for, *Epin.* 984 c 6 πάντων μὲν μετόχων τοῦ ζῆν γεγονότων· δεύτερα δὲ καὶ τρίτα καὶ τέταρτα καὶ πέμπτα, ἀπὸ θεῶν τῶν φανερῶν ἀρξάμενα γενέσεως, εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποτελεῦτᾶν. Here there would be an absolutely intolerable false antithesis, if an antithesis were intended, since the *δύετα καὶ τρίτα κτλ.* are, of course, included in the *πάντα*. But is any antithesis really intended? I believe not. What is wanted to answer to the *πάντων μὲν* clause is something to the effect '(all living, indeed), but not all of the same excellence or worth', 'living beings, but of different degrees'. Instead of completing the sentence neatly, the author varies its form in the middle and says, 'and (the *δέ* after *δύετα* is *and* rather than *but*) the series of second, third . . . orders ends with mankind', the *μὲν* being thus a rather awkward *μὲν solitarium*. This is not elegant writing, but the inelegance seems to me of a kind which would be more natural in a very old man, trying with great difficulty to shape a final message to his fellows, than in any one else.

The author is alleged to show his curious preference for *das Inkonzinne* further in a series of phrases where there is no question of antithesis. Several of these are what Dr. Müller regards as awkward junctures of words by a simple



καί or τε καί. Apart from two cases, for which Dr. Müller himself provides exact parallels from the *Laws*, the list is as follows:

975e 2. ἡ μὲν μεγίστη τε καὶ εἰς πλεῖστα πολεμικὴ κληθεῖσα. (The complete sentence should have been quoted, or at least of the whole clause βοήθεια γίγνοιτ' ἂν μυρία μυρίοις, ἡ μὲν . . . κληθεῖσα, στρατηγικὴ τέχνη. The sense, then, is that the μεγίστη καὶ εἰς πλεῖστα κληθεῖσα βοήθεια is called πολεμικὴ and is the 'art of the general', though, as the speaker goes on to observe, the arts of the physician, navigator, and others are also entitled to the name βοήθεια. Why Dr. Müller thinks there is *Inkonzinnität* in calling the art of war the μεγίστη τε καὶ εἰς πλεῖστα βοήθεια he does not explain, and I do not venture to guess. It is 'on the grand scale', and so may be called μεγίστη;¹ it 'defends' the whole varied life of the πόλις against attacks from all quarters, and so is εἰς πλεῖστα.)

978a 2. τὰ κατὰ μουσικὴν πᾶσαν διαριθμουμένων κινήσεώς τε καὶ φθόγγων δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ. (I am not sure what is supposed to be amiss here. φθόγγοι are regularly spoken of not only as high and low, but as quicker and slower, as, for example, in *Tim.* 80a, and I do not see why μουσικὴ should not be said to depend on 'numeration of motion and tones'. It is a numeration of tones because it states the λόγοι on which the melodic intervals of the scale depend; it is also a numeration of 'motion' because the pitch of the tones depends on the velocity of the motions set up when a 'stroke' is given to the air (*Tim.* 80a-b).)

982e 1. ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω καὶ βελτίω καὶ φίλα τιθεμένω, 'opting for the nobler, better and acceptable', where φίλα, as Harward remarks in his translation, means 'acceptable to heaven', or perhaps (cf. 988c 4), 'to right-minded men', 'the nobler, better and welcome view'. (The use of φίλα is

¹ The στρατηγός is a combatant in a 'public' warfare of his πόλις; the physician who cures my disorder or the navigator who transports me across the waters is engaged in a 'private' war with a malady or with the waters for my benefit. That is the point of μεγίστη.

perhaps a little strange, though it recalls the ὅ τι καλὸν φίλον αἰεί of Euripides, but I cannot see why the *Verbindung* with καί should give any offence.)

989d 7. τὴν τοιαύτην τε καὶ ἀρίστην φύσιν, 'the nature which I have described, which, in fact, is the best'. (An *unusual* combination of words, doubtless, but exactly expressive of the writer's meaning: the studies in question are proper for the type of man who has just been described, and he is, in the Academic estimate, the best type of manhood, and the point could not have been made in fewer words.)¹

987d 5. The merit of the topographical situation of Hellas is that μέσος ἂν εἴη χειμῶνων τε καὶ τῆς θερινῆς φύσεως, 'it lies midway between the winter and summer', i.e. between the frozen and the tropical regions. It is not always χεῖμων, as it is farther north, nor always θέρος, as it is nearer the equator. (Again I cannot conjecture what is the objection intended against the phrase. I cannot suppose it is that the writer uses the common Platonic periphrasis ἡ θερινὴ φύσις for τὸ θέρος, and yet I do not see what else can be meant. To me the words seem both natural and appropriate.)

So far the alleged examples of *Inkonzinnität*, then, appear to me insignificant. The phrases which are next quoted may be more reasonably objected to, on the ground that in some of them there is, as Dr. Müller puts it, a conjunction of 'elements which belong to different planes' (p. 43).

982b 1. τὸ ἐν τάξει τε καὶ οὐρανῷ πόρον ἔχον, 'that which goes on its journey in an orderly way and in the sky'. Such a brachylogy as 'in order and the sky', where the preposition is used only once, though it has to do duty twice in two different senses, strikes an English reader, as it strikes Dr. Müller, as ludicrous. An Englishman thinks at once of Mr. Pickwick's partner, who returned from the Assembly 'in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair'. But is it quite certain that our taste in this matter is a safe index of that of Plato? For the fact that in poetry it would be possible to use the simple dative οὐρανῷ without a preposition

¹ The καί thus has virtually the 'explanatory sense', *id est*.

as a locative might tend to make the phrase ἐν τάξει τε καὶ οὐρανῶ much less sensibly intolerable. Any one who used it at all would probably feel that the ἐν belongs to τάξει only, just as in the line of Euripides, *Phoeniss.* 1430 σὺν παρθένῳ τε καὶ προθυμίᾳ ποδός the σὺν is felt to belong only to παρθένῳ, and the apparent inelegance cannot be used as a convincing argument for deleting the verse. I do not say that the phrase of the *Epinomis* is other than a bad one, but it is bad with the sort of badness I should expect rather in the unrevised utterance of an old and failing man than in the deliberate writing of a younger.

980 b 1. (τιμῶντι θεούς) ὕμνοις τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία γεραίροντι. Here there seems to me no difficulty. The phrase, as Harvard says, 'is a simple hendiadys "hymns of joy"'.

988 b 3. μανθάνομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀριθμόν τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν, 'we learn number and how to count'. It is surely hypercriticism to cavil at the phrase, though, no doubt, it involves an easy *zeugma*.

979 a 6. διὰ δὲ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν καρποὶ τε καὶ ἐγκύμων ἡ γῆ γέγονεν. There is, of course, no difficulty about 'understanding' a γεγόνασι with καρποὶ out of the following γέγονεν. The phrase is a little unusual, again because of the slight *zeugma* involved in taking the verb to mean 'have come to exist' with καρποὶ and 'has become' with ἐγκύμων. But I do not understand how Dr. Müller can talk about a characteristically absurd combination of 'elements which belong to different planes', and make a serious inference to non-Platonic authorship.

977 e 6. ἐν ᾧ—sc. in the process of discovering τὸ θεῖον τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τὸ θνητόν—τὸ θεοσεβὲς γνωρισθήσεται καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὄντως. This is one of Dr. Müller's best examples of the writer's *Vorliebe für das Inkonzinne*. It does look odd at first to have 'the fear of God and arithmetic' coupled together in this way. But if the conjunction is less odd in one writer than in another, it may well be the philosopher who spoke of number as θεῶν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις (*Phileb.* 16c 5), and had already, in the *Timaeus* (47a) asserted that

the chief blessing we owe to the sense of sight is that the spectacle of the rhythmic movements of the 'visible god', οὐρανός, leads to knowledge of number, which is the foundation of 'philosophy'.

A curiously hypercritical attack is made on the arrangement of the argument of 976*e* 1-977*a* 6. The speaker delivers himself to the following effect: 'Of all the arts which have raised man from brutish ignorance to intelligent civilization, there is none which has done more for us than the art of number. This art is the gift of a god, not the product of accident. You may be surprised, though you ought not to be surprised,¹ to learn which god I have in mind. For how can we ascribe this precious gift to any god but the author of all our blessings? What god, then, do I mean? Οὐρανός.' There is a want of concision here which need not surprise us, if we are listening to the latest utterance of a very old man. But there is surely no want of logical order in the thought. Dr. Müller, indeed, complains that the name of the god, which is to come as a surprise, though it should not, is delayed by the rhetorical question πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἴτιον ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ γεγονέναι; So it is. But the delay is intentional. The name is held back for a little, that the 'surprise' may be all the more effective when it comes. If the little artifice strikes us as a very small jest indeed, why, to make much of such small effects is notoriously a trick of the speech of extreme old age.

Objection is taken to the construction (975*a* 2) πὰς ἀνήρ . . . ὅσοις ἀγὼν πρόκειται κτλ. But this belongs to a type of anacoluthon carefully noted, for example, in Riddell's *Digest of Platonic Idioms*, § 275, where we are given, among others,

¹ The meaning is that the speaker, like Timaeus, holds that it is the necessity of keeping count of the Calendar which first prompted the development of an extended system of numerals. This *ought* not to surprise any one who reflects on the problem, but it probably *will* surprise Clinias and Megillus (because they have not been accustomed to reflect on such a question as the origin of the numerals).

the following instances: *Protag.* 345 e 4 οὐχ ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῆ ἐκῶν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι; *Rep.* 426 c 2 ὡς ἀποθανουμένους, ὅς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ; 554 a 11 θησαυροποιοὺς ἀνὴρ, οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος; *Symp.* 187 e 2 προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσῃται; *Phd.* 62 a 3 τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον <δύ> τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν. It is true that commonly the transition is from a plural in the main clause to a singular in the relative, but the passage last quoted shows that the reverse is also possible.

974 a 1 χρόνος βραχὺς ἂν τις εἴη . . . οὗτος δὲ σχεδὸν ἀναπνοὴν δοκεῖ ποιεῖν; 976 c 3 τοῦτο δὲ ταχὺ δρῆ; *ib. d 1*, ἡ σοφία μὲν λέγοιτ' ἂν . . . , ὁ δὲ λαβῶν (sc. αὐτήν). In all these cases we might have had a relative clause without a δέ. No doubt we might, but what evidence of non-Platonic authorship can be drawn from the use of parataxis instead of subordination in these cases? (In the first two instances there seems to be an obvious reason for adopting the paratactical construction; it gives slightly more prominence to the clauses, as the writer's purpose demands.)

In 979 a 4 'there is a change of subject'. But is there? The words from a 1 on run thus: τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἀεὶ λογίζεσθαι, δοκῶ μὲν μείζονος ἕνεκα, καὶ τούτου δὲ σελήνην,¹ καθάπερ εἶπομεν, αὐξανομένην καὶ φθίνουσαν ἐμπούσας, μῆνας πρὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συνεστήσατο, καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἤρξατο συνορᾶν. As I understand the words, the subject of the sentence down to συνεστήσατο (a 4) is ὁ θεός; after the following καί we have a new enunciation, with πάντα as subject to ἤρξατο. The meaning is, 'and as for the fact that all creatures are all the while reckoning numbers in their relations with one another, I think it was to that end, as well as to a greater, that the god brought months together into the year,² setting (in the sky) a moon

¹ This is Burnet's punctuation. But we should write καὶ τούτου δέ, σελήνην.

² i.e. if there were not a moon as well as a sun, or if both had the same period, we should not have, as we now have, the practical problem of computing the Calendar and keeping moon and sun together. It is

that waxes and wanes, and so all creatures began to view number in relation to number'. There is nothing unusual in the construction of the sentence, which only requires correct punctuation; I suspect Dr. Müller's comment arises from the mistake of taking one πάντα, if not both, as accus. masc. with ἀριθμόν.

(See the note on the passage in the *Epinomis of Plato translated by J. Harward* (Oxford, 1928), where the construction and meaning are fully explained.)

978 c 4. The question has just been raised, how did we first come to have the notions of 1 and 2, the simplest of arithmetical concepts? Before answering himself, the speaker remarks parenthetically that many creatures cannot get even so far as this, but in our case God first gave us the capacity to understand what is shown us, and then showed us something (viz. the spectacle of the heavens), which he still continues to show us. There is a touch of unnecessary garrulity about these observations; they might have been suppressed and the answer to the question how we got our first notion of number offered us out of hand. But the garrulity is surely just that which we all know to be characteristic of advanced old age. To my own mind, it is rather evidence for the genuineness of our dialogue than evidence against it; one may observe something of the same kind, for example, in the VIIth *Epistle*; a younger man could have made the letter a good deal shorter, without sacrificing anything of its substance.

'At 979 c 7 there is *Spaltung einer intendierten Antithese*.' I am not sure that I know just what the point of the censure is; to me the sentence in question seems to be constructed quite naturally, and the 'intended antithesis' to be made sufficiently clear. The words are (c 5-8) καὶ ψυχὴν ὅτι μὲν ἀγαθὴν δεῖ (sc. κτᾶσθαι), συγχωρεῖ πᾶς παντί, τὸ δ' ὄντινα τρόπον ἀγαθὴν, ὅτι μὲν αὖ δικαίαν καὶ σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν, καὶ ταῦτα (sc. συγχωρεῖ πᾶς παντί), ὅτι δὲ σοφὴν, φησὶ μὲν this practical need of a Calendar which has driven men into advanced arithmetical calculations.

πᾶς δεῖν (sc. κτᾶσθαι), ἦντινα δὲ σοφίαν . . . οὐδεὶς οὐδενὶ τὸ παράπαν ἔτι συνομολογεῖ τῶν πολλῶν. There is universal agreement that (1) we must have goodness of soul, *but* (2) on the question what kind of goodness there is (a) agreement that it includes justice and temperance and courage, *but* (b) no agreement as to the kind of *wisdom* needed. Thus the first μέν and δέ make a perfectly complete antithesis between the general agreement that we need 'goodness of soul' and the disagreement about the precise character of this goodness. The second μέν and δέ make the point more precise by indicating where the disagreement just mentioned arises. It does not concern three of the commonly recognized 'cardinal virtues', but does concern the fourth, σοφία. It is a mystery to me on what ground this statement can be criticized, unless it is blamed for its slightly pedantic formal logical accuracy, but this can hardly be Dr. Müller's point, and is certainly not the kind of fault which could be made evidence of non-Platonic authorship.

The last sentence to be specially animadverted on in this context is one which has occupied us before, 990 a 3, τὸ δ' ὄνομα λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε, ὃ τις οὐκ ἂν ποτε δόξειεν δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος—ἀστρονομίαν—ἀγνοεῖ τε ὅτι σοφώτατον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι. I am not surprised that Dr. Müller should be offended by the extraordinary combination οὐκ ἂν τις δόξειεν—ἀγνοεῖ τε. But it should have been observed that it is not even certain what the text should be here. The MSS. in general apparently read ἀγνοεῖτε, and, so far as I know, this was what stood in the early printed editions, ἀγνοεῖτε being taken as the opening of a new enunciation. Ficinus, who translates ἀγνοεῖτε as if it were imperative, *nolite ignorare astronomiam sapientissimum quiddam esse*, possibly punctuated the Greek, as some of the older texts do, δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀστρονομίαν ἀγνοεῖτε ὅτι . . . εἶναι; (a rhetorical question). Even in 1854 the Zürich editors of Plato keep ἀγνοεῖτε, as Bekker had done, though punctuating differently, with a full stop at ἀστρονομίαν. Stallbaum's note on the passage shows that ἀγνοεῖ τε was

introduced by Schneider, on no very good MS. authority; it does not satisfy Stallbaum, who proposes a more considerable alteration of his own, and records one or two other alternative conjectures. We cannot therefore assume that the singular construction really comes from the hand of the writer of the *Epinomis*. There may be some further corruption in transcription than the mere coalescence of $\tau\epsilon$ with a preceding word, or, and this seems to me more likely, $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\nu\omicron\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon$ may be sound, if we are dealing, as we may be, with the unrevised first draft of a writer in extreme old age, who is possibly dictating¹ to an amanuensis. (E.g. if we are to mend the text, I should myself prefer to do so by inserting one letter, η , before $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\nu\omicron\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon$, on the supposition that it has either fallen out in transcription, or that its absence is accounted for by the unrevised condition of the whole dialogue.)

On the whole, then, I submit that Dr. Müller's attempt to prove the *Epinomis* suspicious on the ground of alleged misuse of antithesis leads to no result.

The attack is now directed against the writer's method of constructing complex sentences of some length. Dr. Müller's procedure is to produce sample complex sentences from the *Laws*, *Philebus*, *Republic*, in which the formal scheme of construction is clear and coherent and then to contrast these selected Platonic examples with less satisfactorily constructed sentences from the *Epinomis*. As I have said, I regard this procedure as illegitimate, for a double reason. (1) The selection of Platonic examples is itself an arbitrary one; there could be no difficulty in meeting Dr. Müller by a counter-argument founded on the frequent cumbrous and inelegant sentences to be met in *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*. (2) Even if there were not abundant material for such a counter-argument, there is, as I have said, no antecedent reason why Plato's ability to construct complex sentences should not have failed markedly in extreme old age *after* the completion of the *Laws*, and hence, though the sentence-construction of *Epinomis* should be

¹ Cf. Burnet, *Platonism*, p. 86.

much inferior to that of *Laws*, the fact would be no proof of different authorship. As to the sentences chosen by way of contrast from the *Epinomis*, 985 c 1–d 1 is undeniably cumbersome and involved in construction, so much so that I find it hard to believe that what one reads there can be anything but the unrevised utterance of a very old man labouring very hard for expression, but the particular faults censured by Dr. Müller (p. 47) do not appear to me to be really there. He objects that the clause in c 5–6 ὅθεν ἰερά πολλὰ πολλῶν γέγονεν, τὰ δὲ γενήσεται is ‘not a necessary member of the whole’. To me it seems *most* necessary. The whole point of the long sentence is that there are innocent *rituals* which have arisen as consequences of supposed visions or verbal communications with *δαίμονες*, and that these are not to be interfered with needlessly.¹ It is only because the practices in question have acquired ‘consecration’ by ancient use that they must be left undisturbed. The ὅθεν clause, which gives this explanation, is thus strictly indispensable. If it were left out, the reason why a wise legislator will not interfere with these revelations through vision or voice would remain unexplained. Also it is complained that the resumptive *τούτων πάντων* of c 6 breaks the continuity of the sentence. It does, but the construction has already become so complicated by the succession of an ‘accusative in apposition to the sentence’ (*δόξας παραγενομένας*, c 5), following on an ‘accusative absolute’ (*λεχθέν, c 3*), that a break and a fresh start has become imperative. I certainly cannot see that there is anything here which may not be overmatched by the marvellous sentence, *Laws* 887 c 8–888 a 2, *ἀνάγκη γὰρ δὴ... περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον ὡς εἰσὶν*; (where, by the way, precisely the same device of ‘breaking the continuity’ by a resumptive *τούτων δὴ πάντων* is employed, and none too soon, at 887 e 7).

Of the sentence which begins at 986 b 3 we are told that ‘in spite of the antitheses, as a whole it is only a stringing together of separate parts’. The ‘antitheses’ surely deserve no sarcasm. There are only three; we are not to say of the

¹ On the principle *quieta non movere*. (Cf. *Laws* 738 b, c.)

heavenly bodies that οἱ μὲν θεοὶ εἰσιν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ, nor that οἱ μὲν γνήσιοι, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοί τινες οἴους οὐδὲ θέμις εἰπεῖν, and we are not to consecrate τῷ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, τῷ δὲ μῆνα, τοῖς δὲ no season whatever. There is no affected straining after unreal antithesis in these simple and natural expressions. The other criticism only means that the sentence is of simple construction and contains no internal complexity. Why should it, when the thought contains none? The thought is, 'we are not to say that some of the heavenly bodies are gods and others not, or that some of them are legitimately born and some base-born, but to regard them as one family, and not to consecrate seasons to some, but leave others unrecognized'. I do not know how this could be said without affectation in a different way. Unless, indeed, the complaint reduces to this, that for καὶ τιμὰς ἀποδιδόμεν at c 1 it would have been possible to say τιμὰς ἀποδιδόντες. I do not dwell on 986c 5-d 1, on which the same stricture is made, but I would ask any open-minded student to read that straightforward sentence and find out, if he can, what least word or particle there is in it to discriminate it from the Greek of the *Laws*. Or I would suggest that Dr. Müller himself should reconstruct these two sentences in what he considers the genuine Platonic style.

974 b 2. ἡ δὲ φυγῆ φεύγει . . . ἐξευρίσκειν. This, we are told, is a specially bad case of inability to construct a complex sentence, for it contains twenty-one genitives in succession. But how has the critic made up the count? He takes a transparent genitive absolute clause like ὡς ἀξίας τούτων οὐδεμιᾶς οὔσης ἐπὶ κλησιν ῥηθῆναι τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σοφίας τάνθρῳπινα, and counts this as six of his twenty-one; the immediately following equally transparent genitive absolute clause τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς . . . οὐ πάνυ δυναμένης counts for seven more, and the preceding expression, πρὸς τινα φρόνησιν τῶν λεγομένων τεχνῶν ἢ φρονήσεων ἢ τινων ἄλλων τοιούτων ὡς οἴομεθα ἐπιστημῶν, provides the remaining eight. (Such a phrase as τῶν καλῶν ἀνδρῶν is thus reckoned as three, not as one.) The result is that a sentence which is as clear as

daylight to the reader can be made to figure, by the device of not quoting it, as proof of the imbecility and helplessness of the writer. If we are to argue in this fashion, I am content to remark that in the sentence from *Laws*, 887c 8 ἀνάγκη δὴ κτλ. to 888a 2 ὡς εἰσίν; already cited for a different purpose, Plato 'has 33 genitives', and just the same disregard of *hypotaxis*.

The list of dreadful examples closes with yet a third fling at the sentence about ἀστρονομία, 990a 2 ff. The complaint this time amounts to no more than what might be said about many sentences in the *Laws* and other Platonic works, that (apart from brief relative clauses) the sentence has no complex periodic structure. In fact the author's own summing up of his case, so far as it is based on this list of sentences, comes only to this, 'these examples present a complete contrast' with an elaborated period taken from the *Laws* (892d 5 f.), and chosen, of course, rather than any other sentence, precisely for the sake of urging this point.

Finally, three complex periods from the *Epinomis* are written out in full, the sentences 988b 7-c 8, 973a 1-5, 986c 5-d 4; against them are set *Laws*, 886b 10-d 3, *Sophist*. 216a 1-4, *Phileb.* 15d 8-16a 3, with the result that (p. 50) 'Plato's sentences' are found 'superior to those of the *Epinomis* in order, articulation, combined fullness and clarity'. That is, the *Epinomis* is not on a level in the qualities of expression with *Sophistes*, *Philebus*, *Laws*. But since, if genuine, it must be the latest work of Plato, and may belong to the very end of a prolonged life, who would expect it to exhibit no falling off when compared with, I will not say the *Sophist* or *Philebus*, but even with the *Laws*? Not to say that the contrast would appear much less marked if one chose as the standard of comparison the worst constructed and not the best constructed periods of *Laws* and *Philebus*. What has been shown so far is, at most, not that the 'author of the *Epinomis* is inferior to Plato in *Formkraft*', but that he is inferior to the Plato who wrote the *Laws*. This is, in itself, far from being proof that he is not the same Plato at

the end of a long life, and weary with writing the *Laws*, as well as from other causes. I may feel that the writer of many pages of the *Second Part* of *Faust* is inferior in *Formkraft* to the Goethe who wrote *Part I* or the Helen episode of *Part II* itself, but the writer was none the less Goethe.

Dr. Müller himself partly recognizes that his argument up to this point is incomplete. The curious thing is that it does not strike him that the *obvious* incompleteness lies in ignoring the possibility that the failure in *Formkraft* may be real, but be the effect of age and declining powers. The one alternative to sheer incompetence which occurs to him as a possible explanation of the peculiarities of the dialogue is sheer perversity. The writer perhaps wrote oddly on purpose, because he admired Plato, the Plato of the *Laws*, for the wrong things, and so set himself to imitate them. This leads to the raising of the double question (a) what is really characteristic of the style of the *Laws*? (b) what did our author suppose to be specially characteristic of that work? (p. 51).

Dr. Müller's answer to these questions is that if we study the *Laws* as a whole, we find that there are two different manners to be distinguished within that work, one in which the style really is predominantly that of dialogue, another, as, for example, throughout *Laws v*, in which there is an all-but-complete absence of *das Dialogische*. Since the *Epinomis* is, to all intents and purposes, an unbroken exposition by a single speaker, we should naturally expect to find that the 'imitator' has modelled his style on the long undramatic 'stratum' in the *Laws*, and particularly on *Laws v*, which is one continuous monologue. But we find that the fact is otherwise; it is the 'dialogue sections' of the *Laws* which have served as a model for the *Epinomis* (p. 52).

This would certainly be a curious fact if the point could be demonstrated. But I doubt whether it could be established by Dr. Müller's methods. The proof he offers is as follows. He quotes at length the elaborate period with which *Laws, v*, opens, 726 a 1-727 a 7, remarking, truly

enough, that on analysis the period breaks up into a number of brief clauses which are 'paratactically' grouped together with little in the way of subordination. Since one of his chief complaints against the *Epinomis* has been the tendency to 'string clauses together' by *parataxis*, we might expect that his inference would be that its author has taken *Laws*, v, in particular as the model which he feebly tries to imitate. But this is just what Dr. Müller denies. If we study the opening period of the great monologue of *Laws*, v, we find that the separate clauses of which it is composed are 'articulated with the uttermost minuteness, expressed with the greatest concision, well balanced in their proportions, and succeed one another by a law of rigid logical coherence' (*ib.*). If we compare the manner of the passage with that of, e.g., *Rep.* 621 b 8-d 3 (καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων . . . εἶ πράττωμεν), or *Laws*, 968 e 7-969 c 3 (τὸ λεγόμενον, ὦ φίλοι . . . πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας γενομένου), we shall see that the proem to *Laws*, v, and the peroration of the myth of Er in the *Republic*, for all the differences between them, have a closer resemblance in manner than either of them has with the passage from *Laws*, xii, or with the *Epinomis* (p. 55). This proves two things at once, (1) that it is characteristic of the *Laws* to make a real distinction in manner between the monologues and the conversational sections, the fully elaborated and balanced period being specially preferred for monologue, whereas, in the conversational sections, the subdivisions mark mere breathing-spaces or momentary resting-places in the advance of a continuous stream of discourse, not the 'fixed boundaries which delimit the individual members of a clearly articulated organic structure' (*ib.*); (2) it is *this* 'stratum' of the *Laws* which the writer of the *Epinomis* means to imitate by his neglect of accurate antithesis, symmetry, and periodic structure. (That is, he proves his imbecility by choosing as the model for a long continuous *Vortrag* just the manner of the part of the *Laws* which Plato means to serve as contrast and relief to the *Vorträge* of the principal character. At least, this is what I take Dr. Müller to imply.)

Thus we get as our final result a marked contrast between the *Laws* and the *Epinomis*. In the *Laws* Plato no longer makes the principles of style which dominated the *Republic* the basis of the whole composition (this is shown by the contrast between the manner of the *Republic* and that of the 'conversational' parts of the *Laws*), but he still retains them for individual sections of the work (i.e. he can write in the same manner when it suits his purpose, as in the proem to *Laws*, v). The *Epinomis* can echo the style of the conversational section of the *Laws*, but cannot catch the manner of those parts of it which recall the *Republic*. The explanation must be that the author of the *Laws*, being the man who had once written the *Republic*, could still strike the old chords when he chose; the writer of the *Epinomis* had no such history of an 'earlier manner' behind him, and could therefore only imitate and caricature the novelties and oddities of the later Platonic style. *Ergo*, he was not Plato (p. 56).

The argument reflects great credit on the ingenuity of its author. But will it really hold water? Can we really feel much confidence in the truth of its fundamental premiss that there really is a hard and fast difference in manner between two parts of the *Laws*, the dialogue and the *Vorträge*? (Of course we should expect to find *some* difference; no man could construct speeches of a few lines in precisely the same manner as what are, in fact, 'lectures' or 'disquisitions' extending over many pages. But the question is whether such differences as we can detect are more than differences in degree; do they afford ground for believing that Plato of set purpose and consciously adopted two radically different manners in the *Laws*? It is this which must be made out before we can argue that the alleged resemblance of the style of the *Epinomis* to that of a period taken from *Laws*, xii, and its alleged difference from the manner of the proem to *Laws*, v, is proof that we are dealing with the writing of an unintelligent imitator who has an eye only for the odd and novel.) Dr. Müller himself frankly

admits (p. 52) that *proof* of the all-important thesis that the opening period of *Laws*, v, may be taken as a standard typical example of the manner of Plato in the *Vorträge* of the *Laws* is impossible, though, he says, 'any one may easily convince himself of the fact'. Now it seems to me that the admission suggests grave doubts about the value of the whole argument. Once more, Dr. Müller is arguing from data unconsciously selected with a view to bringing out the conclusion he desires. We should expect the opening period of the great address on the ruling principles of a good life which fills *Laws*, v, and in which the speaker has the whole body of his prospective citizens present in imagination as auditors, would be written with exceptional care and attention to every detail, just as we should, for very similar reasons, expect the sentences from *Rep.* x in which Socrates concludes the story of Er with an explicit statement of the moral of the whole *Republic* to be written with equal care, for the same reasons. Both passages must be made exceptionally impressive if they are not to be failures. That, with all the differences which discriminate the style of the *Republic* from that of the *Laws*, two such passages should be more like one another in the carefulness with which both have been written than either is like some third period taken somewhere out of the *Laws*, is surely not enough to establish the point that there is more difference between the manner of the 'monologues' and that of the 'conversational passages' of the same work than such a difference in degree as no writer can well avoid making between the manner of a long speech and that of a short one. If *Laws*, v, is to be appealed to, and I hardly think the appeal fair in any case, to establish Dr. Müller's point, it would have been a fairer procedure to select any period from its pages rather than the proem as a sample of the *average* manner of the *Vorträge* in the *Laws*. *Laws*, x, again, contains *Vorträge* of some length which deserve to be taken into account, and in xi–xii, from 931 e 8 to 960 c 1, we have a continuous *Vortrag*, only broken by one interruption of five words at 951 c 5. A very thorough

examination of such parts of the *Laws* is an indispensable preliminary to any conclusion about the amount and kind of difference of style to be found in its 'strata', as Dr. Müller calls them, and I do not think it would be at all hard to produce a considerable number of long passages from the continuous discourses of the main speaker, in *Laws* x, for example, which would leave a very different impression of the manner of his *Vorträge* from that Dr. Müller gets out of a sample which happens to be favourable to the conclusion he is determined to draw. (The passage I have already cited for other purposes, 887c 8–888a 2, would be a good example among others, and seeing that it comes from a speech which begins at 887c 5 and runs on to 888d 5, I do not think it would be reasonable to urge that it must be regarded as 'dialogue'.) But unless it can be made out that there really is a conscious difference in *principle* between the styles of different 'strata' of the *Laws*, the whole ingenious argument we are considering falls to the ground. We may perfectly well admit that the *Epinomis* is inferior in style to the longest and most carefully composed monologue of the *Laws*, and more like parts of that work written with less elaboration of diction, and yet hold that the explanation is not stupid and incompetent imitation, but the failure of a very aged man's hand to exhibit its former cunning. In any case, an inference based on the inferiority of the *Epinomis* to a particularly brilliantly written period, to which most of the periods of the *Laws* are distinctly inferior, cannot be regarded as having much probative force.

With Dr. Müller's return to consideration of detail (p. 56) we find ourselves once more on ground where definite argumentation becomes possible.

The *Epinomis*, we are told, has no such 'concentrated expressions' as διδαχὴ μετὰ συνουσίας πολλῆς (*Laws*, 968c 6), or κεφαλῆς νοῦ τε κοινωνίας εἰκόνα (*ib.* 969b 7, said of the *νυκτερινὸς σύλλογος*). This, I think, may be admitted, but the *Epinomis*, after all, covers something less than twenty pages of Stephanus, and the non-occurrence of such pregnant

phrases within those limits might easily be accounted for as a natural consequence of age and failing vigour. One would not expect a wearied octogenarian to shine, as he might have done even at seventy, as a coiner of terse and telling phrases. The same considerations would, so far as I can see, completely account for a peculiarity of style of which Dr. Müller produces a long list of examples—the undeniable tendency of the writer to repeat the same word or small group of words, sometimes more than once, within a few lines. Some of the instances on the list, indeed, should in fairness be removed. They could hardly have been reckoned defects by a critic who remembered that Plato, like the classical Greek authors in general, never shows the exaggerated objection of the modern essayist to repeating the same word in the same context, if it is the *mot juste* for that which is being spoken of. Possibly Dr. Müller has never attempted the translation of a Platonic dialogue into a modern vernacular. I am sure that if he tries the task, he will discover that one of the great difficulties in the way of a conscientious translator is that, rightly or wrongly, our modern taste absolutely demands much more variation than Plato's did; one has perpetually to be obscuring the point that the same substantive, adjective, or verb is being repeated in the Greek, because *our* ear finds the recurrence unendurably monotonous. (I speak with feeling, being comparatively fresh from the making of an English version of the *Timaeus* in which my pious intention of having one standing rendering for each habitually repeated verb of 'making' was constantly being forced to submit to defeat.) Thus, I think it hypercritical to see evidence of a hand other than Plato's in the fact that the first sentence of our dialogue tells us (973*a* 3) that we have met to consider *τίτι ποτέ χρὴ λόγῳ διεξιελθεῖν* the question what *φρόνησις* is, and the second says, three lines lower down, that *τὰ μὲν ἅλλα ἅπαντα διεξήλθομεν*, and still more hypercritical to object to the recurrence of *σφόδρα* at 974*c* 2, on the ground that the same intensifying adverb has been used three lines before.

As an illustration of the emptiness of such complaints, I allow myself at this moment to turn to the text of the *Laws* at random. The first words that meet my eye are (817e 5) ἔστιν τρία μαθήματα, λογισμοὶ μὲν καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀριθμοὺς ἐν μάθημα—a wholly unnecessary repetition within the length of a line of Burnet's text. Less than a page further on, my eye is caught by a similar example, 818c 1, οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο ἀνθρώποις θεὸς οὐδὲ δαίμων οὐδὲ ἥρωσ οἶος δυνατὸς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν σὺν σπουδῇ ποιεῖσθαι πολλοῦ δ' ἂν δεήσειεν ἄνθρωπός γε θεῖος γενέσθαι κτλ.

These examples seem to me to be very much on a level with most of those given by Dr. Müller from the *Epinomis* (pp. 56–7), and to show that the peculiarity on which he comments is already present visibly enough in the *Laws*. Indeed, the tendency to such repetition of a phrase, once used, in the immediate context is, I should have said, a not unfamiliar feature of the talk and the writing of the very old. I should accept Dr. Müller's remark that 'the expression is singularly hampered' and loses 'freedom' in consequence of this peculiarity (p. 57) as strictly true, and I should call it an 'incompetence of the writer', without any reservation, only adding that, as the example of Goethe's latest prose shows, it is the kind of incompetence which may befall the greatest masters of language in extreme old age, as physical energy decays. If we should have before us here, as we may have, the last thoughts of an old and physically feeble man, to whom even the act of dictation is a severe fatigue, the facts would be explained in a very natural way. The alternative is to suppose a writer who, being in the full possession of his powers, must be pronounced almost imbecile. But the weighty pronouncement on mathematics (990c 5–991b 4) is not the work of a feeble or even a second-rate mind. I own I do not know how to account for the combination of the power of thought shown in that passage with the comparative lack of power of expression which marks the dialogue as a whole, on any hypothesis so well as by supposing that I am reading the unrevised 'last words'

of a powerful intelligence, sadly hampered by the failure in expression which may attend the old age of the greatest.

The zest for depreciation becomes almost comical when we are invited to measure the helplessness of our author by the consideration that a λέγοις ἄν in 980*a* 6 is followed eighteen lines lower down by a λέγοις ἄν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. I should as soon think of athetizing *Laws*, iii, on the ground that the same interlocutor replies to two successive remarks (683*c* 7, *d* 5) with the same conventional πάνν μὲν οὖν, or that another speaker, who has replied to an observation with πόθεν; at 676*a* 4, answers the very next observation at *ib.* 7 with λέγεις δὲ πόθεν; When it is urged on me that in the *Epinomis* Clinias says ταῦτ' ἔσται at 979*e* 6, and again the Athenian says ἔσται ταῦτα at 980*c* 4 (twenty-two lines of Burnet's text intervening), I feel satisfied to rejoin that in *Laws*, iii, on p. 687, one and the same speaker, Megillus, makes the four consecutive responses, τί μῆν; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί μῆν; πῶς δ' οὐ; in the compass of ten lines (*c* 8–*d* 5).

Dr. Müller himself, however, is not content to let his unfortunate author off with a conviction on the minor count of *inability* to avoid monotony. He adds that the work also shows a weakness for unnecessary variation of phrase, the inference being, I suppose, that when the writer is monotonous, it is from deliberate perversity. Two examples are given of this needless and senseless fancy for variety, 978*c* 7 τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας γένος followed by τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς μέρος and 988*c* 2 ὡς τε ἐγένοντο οἰοί τε ἐγίγοντο. I am afraid that if we had found γένος a second time in the first passage, where we actually have μέρος, the words would not have pleased Dr. Müller any better; they would have furnished one more example, along with the rest, of the writer's un-Platonic unfreedom of expression. But really, Dr. Müller cannot expect to have it both ways. In the other passage it does not seem clear that the variation of the tenses may not be properly significant. The question a theogony proposes to answer is a double one, *quo modo orti sunt di et quales nascebantur*? The first half of the question is answered by a bare

statement of origin; to answer the second we have to be told the history of a *process*; for precisely the same reason, the third verb of the complete sentence is also imperfect, *μετεχειρίζοντο*.¹

I do not know why Dr. Müller should lay, as he says he does, 'special stress' on the six or seven passages he now proceeds to quote, but I will examine them in order.

978c 1-4. *φύσιν ταύτην ἔχουσιν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς πρὸς τὸ δυνατοῦς ἐννοεῖν εἶναι . . . ὥστε μαθεῖν δυνατοῖς εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀριθμείν*. Why should not Plato himself make both

¹ But it should be remarked that, in any case, there is a difficulty about the text of the passage, created by the *καὶ ὁ μὲν* which the best MSS. have between *ἐγίνοντο* and *καὶ οἷας μετεχειρίζοντο πράξεις*. *ὁ μὲν* is not easy to emend, nor do the words look so much like interpolation as like an uncorrected first draft of a remark the expression of which has still to be adjusted. That is, I take the sense to require that *ὁ μὲν* in c 2 demands to be understood as meaning *ὁ μὲν λόγος*, so that the thought is 'when men first began to think about the gods (*ὅτε περὶ θεῶν ἦν ἀνθρώποις διανοήματα πρῶτα*), their origin and the process of their birth, and, in some accounts, the series of their actions'. The speaker seems to have a vague recollection in his mind that he has begun his sentence with the word *λόγος*. So he has: *λόγον δὴ καὶ πολὺν καὶ καλὸν ἔχει κτλ.*; but *ὁ μὲν* cannot, of course, be grammatically referred back to *λόγον* here. There is exactly the same difficulty in the succeeding clause (c 4) *μηδ' ὡς οἱ δεύτεροι, ἐν οἷς πρεσβύτατα μὲν τὰ πυρὸς ἐλέγετο κτλ.*, where *οἱ δεύτεροι* must mean *οἱ δεύτεροι λόγοι*, though grammatically the structure of the sentence should make this impossible. The sense of the whole is 'it is a plausible view that when men first began to think about the origin of the gods, the process of their birth, and, in one account, of their actions, the tales they told were not acceptable to the sober-minded, nor yet was the later account in which fire, &c., were made the oldest of things', i.e. neither a theogony like Hesiod's nor a cosmogony like those of the 'Pre-Socratics' is satisfactory to sound thinkers. But the expression of the thought defies all grammar in a way which, to my own mind, makes it inconceivable that the sentence can have ever been written for circulation as it stands. It must represent a hastily-set-down, or more probably dictated, first sketch for something yet to be written. The presence of half-formed sentences like this seems almost to *prove* that the *Epinomis* is an unrevised draft of Plato's thoughts, left unrevised from sheer *pietas*, not a composition deliberately sent out to the public by Philippus or any man.

the statements that it is τὸ πᾶν from which we get a φύσις capable of conceiving number, and that it is 'our Father' who teaches us to count? This is not vain repetition; the thought is the twofold one that we are so constituted as to be capable of learning the lesson, and that there is a divine being who takes kindly thought for us and *intentionally* provides the opportunity of learning it, a doctrine which belongs as much to the *Timaeus* as to the *Epinomis*. If it is the assonance παντός—πατρός which is objected to, it is enough to remark that there are some three lines, and a complete break in enunciation, indicated by a 'question-mark', between the two words.

980 c 8–9. The speaker says that he finds it necessary, since antiquity has given us a bad theogony, κακῶς ἀπεικασάντων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, to make an improved one, βελτίον ἀπεικάσαι, on the lines of the doctrines he has already laid down, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον. It is awkward, to be sure, that ἔμπροσθεν in c 8 should mean 'in the times before our own', and in c 9 'in the earlier part of our conversation', especially as the ambiguity could so easily have been avoided by writing τῶν παλαιῶν in c 8. Here again, I find it impossible to believe in an incompetence of the author so great as to make him repeat himself in this quite unnecessary fashion, but I can easily understand the inelegance in a mere first draft of something intended to receive proper literary form before circulation. It is precisely the kind of inelegance any man admits into *memoranda*, but is careful to remove in preparing them for publication. Its presence in our dialogue once more strongly suggests to me that the work is an unrevised record of notes set down by a great man, or taken down from his dictation, which have been left unrevised owing to his death, and circulated with all their roughnesses because excessive reverence for a master's *ipsisima verba* has forbidden all correction.

982 e 4. πορείαν δὲ καὶ χορείαν πάντων χορῶν καλλίστην καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτην χορεύοντα. Presumably the objection here is to the jingle πορείαν—χορείαν, as Dr. Müller

quotes only so much of the words. I should have thought this a trivial fault, much less noticeable than the reiteration *χορείαν—χορῶν—χορεύοντα*, or the slightly harsh *zeugma* of *πορείαν . . . χορεύοντα*. But once more, does not the whole phrase read much more like one set down in a memorandum intended to receive subsequent elaboration and correction than a sentence deliberately 'passed for publication' by any man?

981 a 1. εἰ δ' ἔχει τοῦτο οὕτως, τό γε πρῶτον ἡμῖν τοῦ πρώτου τῆς γενέσεως πιθανώτερον ἂν εἴη σχεδὸν ὑπηργμένον· καὶ θῶμεν δὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς εὐσχημονέστερον ἔχειν. Here the construction seems to me as characteristic of Plato as the thought; the antithesis between τὸ πρῶτον τῆς γενέσεως according to 'us', and 'according to the old theogonies' and the Ionian cosmologies is a perfectly correct one; again the words καὶ θῶμεν . . . ἔχειν do not simply repeat what has just been said; *our* πρῶτον or ἀρχή is both 'more credible' and 'more seemly' than that of our rivals. Cf. *Laws*, 892 a 3, δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστί, σωμαίων ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἄρχει.

988 c. 'Confusion (*Nebeneinander*) of ψυχή as cosmic principle and human ψυχή'; (at least I suppose the accusation is meant to be one of making a *confusion*: there could be no reason to be offended by the *juxtaposition* as such). I do not understand the ground for complaint here. Since Plato certainly held that all ψυχαί are of one *kind*, there is no reason why he should not speak of 'soul as a cosmic principle' and the human soul *nebeneinander*. But the whole passage 988 c 1–e 4 seems to me to speak of ψυχή as 'cosmic principle', exactly as Plato speaks of ψυχή or ψυχαί in *Laws*, x. What is said is that the δεύτεροι λόγοι, those of the Ionian cosmologists, teach that body sets itself moving by 'heat and cooling' (θερμότητι καὶ ψύξεσι) and other such methods; it is not ψυχή which sets both itself and body going. But *our* view (988 d) is that it is ψυχή which sets bodies moving, and their weight (βάρος) is no objection to this doctrine.

Since all effects are thus caused by *ψυχαί*, good or evil, and the 'best soul' moves towards good (988*e*), the victory of good over evil is assured. This is exactly the language which is used in *Laws*, x, about soul as the source of all cosmic movements, and the distinction between a 'best soul', which causes only 'orderly movements', and others which give rise to disorderly motions (*Laws*, 896*e*). The argument all through refers to 'souls' as 'cosmic principles' of orderly or disorderly motions, is expressed without confusion, and agrees in every detail with the *Laws*. If there is an error in it, it is an error for which Plato is himself responsible.

990*a* 7. τὸν τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰς ἑπτὰ περιόδους (sc. ἔσκεμμένον). We should certainly find the phrase more pleasing if the last word were away. But, once more, is it not clear that no man sitting down to compose an imitation of a Platonic dialogue, however slender his attainments, would deliberately write so intolerable a phrase as 'the seven περίοδοι out of the eight περίοδοι'? Have we not here something not far short of demonstration that we are reading words which have been taken down as they were dictated, and have never been read over by the speaker or subjected to the revision of an editor? I feel this so strongly myself that I own I should think it necessary, if I were once convinced that the *Epinomis* is an imitation, to delete περίοδους as a manifest 'gloss', and I am surprised to see the word retained here by those who believe in the authorship of Philippos. If the words were so taken down from Plato's lips, I can understand that *pietas* might forbid any 'editing' of them; I cannot understand how any author who had read over what he had written could let them remain.

Exactly the same problem recurs at 990*b* 1, within the same sentence, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρησαί, μὴ θαυμαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως. No man *could* write φύσις . . . μετέχουσα θαυμαστῆς φύσεως, though it is what might come from the lips of a man dictating his thought as it formed itself in his mind, particularly if he were an old and wearied man, no longer able to express

himself very readily. I cannot, therefore, agree with Dr. Müller that his examination of details shows 'that Plato cannot be the author of the *Epinomis*'. I think closer consideration of some of the 'details' suggests very strongly, though it does not absolutely prove, that the author is more likely to have been the aged Plato than to have been any one else.

Dr. Müller reserves to the last place in this division of his dissertation an argument, stated in general terms and not supported by any detailed examination of the *Epinomis*, based on the broad principles of sentence-construction. The order of words and clauses in Plato's later style, as we know it from the *Laws*, is intricate and difficult, but, it is urged, examination shows that it is based on certain broad principles. The apparent dislocation of natural order in the sentences of the *Laws* has the deliberate purpose of causing attention to be specially directed to the components of the sentence which are most important for the thought; these are made to stand out in bold relief. This is shown to be so by the consideration (p. 60) that one of the writer's favourite devices is to postpone important words to the end of a sentence, the intention being to arouse a 'tension' or 'anticipation' (*Spannung*) which receives its resolution as the sentence closes. We may say, then, that 'the rhetorical-dialectic form of the sentence', which we find in the earlier dialogues, is 'surrendered, but surrendered not for formlessness, but for a form which is wholly determined from within, adapts itself to the *Wesen* of the words, and brings their sensuous value directly before intuition'. But the incompetent writer of the *Epinomis* was blind to these principles. He saw nothing in the style of the *Laws* but its apparent freedom from all external rules, and this is what he set himself to imitate. Hence the sentences of the *Epinomis* really are, as those of the *Laws* are not, formless (p. 61).

With what Dr. Müller says here about the style of the *Laws* I should very largely agree. I am not, indeed, sure that the typical sentence-patterns of the *Laws* are not more

seriously determined than Dr. Müller apparently allows by a consideration he does not mention, anxiety to avoid *hiatus*.¹ But there is at least much truth in what he says about Plato's anxiety to shape the sentence so that the emphasis falls on the constituents important for the thought, and again, about the device of creating a *Spannung* which is discharged by the closing words. The sentences of the *Laws* are very far from being really 'formless'; it must have required great care and artifice to create them, and this is, to my mind, a reason for thinking it unlikely that much of the work was dictated, though the not infrequent smaller or greater 'tangles' of the grammar seem to show that it has not received the writer's last touches. Also, I confess myself to finding the *Epinomis* decidedly less carefully wrought in this respect than the *Laws*. But so far as it is safe to judge from general impressions—and a general impression is really all we have to go upon in comparing the one work as a whole with the other—I do not see that the inferiority is greater than might be expected if the *Epinomis* is, as it must be if it is Plato's, the last production of an extremely old man and, for that very reason, is likely to have been wholly or mainly dictated. May not the difference between a page of the *Laws* at its best and a page of the *Epinomis* be just the difference between Plato still able to construct his own 'manuscript', and the same Plato, old, weary, and able only to dictate his thoughts to another?

VI

So far, as Dr. Müller has said, the results of his discussion are purely negative. It is taken as proved that Plato did not compose the *Epinomis*, and inferred (perhaps too hastily) that Philippus did. We have still to discover, if we can,

¹ On the reasons which most probably led Isocrates to introduce the rule of avoiding *hiatus* and Plato to adopt it from him, see the suggestive remarks of Burnet, *Platonism*, pp. 54–5. They are good reasons, but of a different kind from those used by Dr. Müller to explain the manner of the *Laws*.

why Philippus made this addition to the *Laws*. What is its real purpose?

In the first place (62-63), the all but complete absence of genuine dialogue from his work shows that, though he felt bound to adopt the dialogue form in order to connect his disquisition with the *Laws*, it was, for him, a merely dead external form, as it had never been for Plato, at least in his writings. (Dr. Müller seems to forget the *Timaeus*, which is an unbroken and wholly undramatic *Vortrag* introduced by a conversation really intended simply to point forward to the *Critias*.) Having adopted this form for his work, however, he overdoes it, as only an unskilful imitator would. (This refers to the previous attempt to draw a hard and fast line between the style of the more conversational parts of the *Laws* and that of Book V, and to show that the *Epinomis* is modelled on the former.) The object of the *Epinomis* is to insist on mathematics and astronomy as the studies which will lead to genuine σοφία. We understand, therefore, why the *names* of these sciences are carefully kept back until their exposition has made their full significance clear to us. But when we do reach the point at which it would be appropriate to name them, we find an unintelligent reluctance to give the technical names, which would have been impossible to Plato. The word ἀριθμητική is not used,¹ στερεομετρία is introduced with unnecessary circumlocution (ταύτη ἦν δὴ στερεομετρίαν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ προστυχεῖς αὐτῇ γεγονότες (990 d 8), the name γεωμετρία is actually censured (ὁ καλοῦσι μὲν σφόδρα γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν, *ib. d 1*). Astronomy itself is spoken of in the following way, σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον ἀκούσαντι, τὸ δ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε, ὃ τις οὐκ ἂν ποτε δόξειεν δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀστρονομίαν (990 a 2). All this strikes Dr. Müller as rather childish and rather perplexing.

Before we consider Dr. Müller's explanation of the puzzle, I must point out that there are excellent reasons for this

¹ But it *is* used once, as I have already observed, 977 e 2 πάντα δ' ἀπολείπεται τὸ παράπαν, ὅταν ἀριθμητικὴν τις ἀνέλη.

unwillingness to use the familiar names. The reason for not simply saying that two of the studies meant are geometry and stereometry are actually given by the writer himself. He is urging from 990 c 5 to 990 e 1 that the real objects studied in 'plane and solid geometry' are certain classes of *numbers*. What has been called *γεωμετρία*, in so far as it is a genuine science, is the 'assimilation of numbers which are not naturally similar by reference to surfaces (*ἐπιπέδων*, perhaps meaning *ἐπιπέδων ἀριθμῶν*, 'surface-numbers'). That is, geometry, as an exact science, has nothing to do with 'earth-measuring'; it is the study of the 'quadratic surds', exactly as plane geometry has sometimes been said in later days to be the 'algebra of complex numbers'. *στερεομετρία*, as a science, again has nothing to do with 'gauging' cubic capacity; it also is a method of 'assimilating' naturally dissimilar numbers by considering their third powers. It is, in fact, the study of 'cubic surds'.

The point is that, contrary to the current opinion, 'irrationals' *are* numbers, and that it is really a *numerical* problem we are investigating when we deal with a problem of plane or solid geometry.¹ What is called the finding of a line the square on which shall be double of a given square, or the cube on which double of a given cube, is really the finding of $\sqrt{2}$ or $\sqrt[3]{2}$. The names *γεωμετρία*, *στερεομετρία*, obscure this important point, that the problems are really numerical, and therefore we may not use them without protest. The same consideration, I believe, explains why the most fundamental of the mathematical disciplines, the study of *ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἔχόντων* (990 c 6), that is, of the natural integers, is not formally called *ἀριθμητική*. *ἀριθμητική*, from the author's point of view, includes not only the study of integers but that of the quadratic and cubic surds shortly to be mentioned; it is not, therefore, correctly used as the *nomen proprium* for its own most fundamental sub-species, the 'arithmetic of the natural integers'. As for *ἀστρονομία*,

¹ Or to speak with Descartes, problems about *loci*, linear, plane, or solid, are all reducible to the solution of *equations*.

the context in which it is mentioned (990*a*) fully explains what is said about the name. It might be supposed that what is meant is no more than the contents of the Hesiodic astronomical poem, an empirical knowledge of the heliacal risings and settings of constellations which are important events in the Calendar of the farmer or the navigator. This is not what *we* mean when we say that astronomy conducts us to the knowledge and fear of God; what *we* mean by the word is the scientific determination of the orbits and periods of the planets, a very different thing. It is exactly in the same spirit that Socrates in the *Republic* (530*a-b*) explains to Glaucon that his philosophic statesmen are to study a mathematical 'astronomy' very different from what is currently called by that name.

To return to Dr. Müller's argument. There is a second problem suggested to him by the mannerisms of our dialogue (the first problem, as we have seen, is really no problem at all). The *Epinomis* exhibits a tendency to 'pathetic rhetoric'. The examples selected are the use of *anaphora* at 981*d* 7 τὸ γὰρ πλείστον πυρὸς ἔχει, ἔχει μὴν γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων τῶν ἄλλων βραχέα μέρη; 977*b* 2 εἴτε κόσμον εἴτε ὄλυμπον εἴτε οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῷ λέγειν, λεγέτω μὲν κτλ.; and especially 992*a* 4 οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, αὕτη ἡ τροφή, ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα. Indeed, Dr. Müller goes so far as to say (p. 65) that these last words alone would 'be sufficient to prove the spuriousness' of the dialogue. So we have to ask ourselves what is the explanation of this 'un-Platonic' fondness for 'rhetorical-pathetical' expressions? Are they due to native temperament, or are they only a stylistic trick or mannerism? Dr. Müller proposes to find an answer to both his questions—we have already seen what is the *right* answer to the first of them—from a consideration of our dialogue, so to say (the phrase is mine, not Dr. Müller's), as a function of its *personnel*.¹

¹ Dr. Müller's own phrase, not an easy one in English, is *wenn man den Dialog der Epinomis . . . betrachtet . . . als solchen, als Angelegenheit der Personen des Dialoges*. I trust my shorter formula represents the sense accurately.

Before I examine his treatment of the problem, I should like to ask the preliminary question whether there is anything particularly un-Platonic about the so-called *rhetorisch-pathetische Redeweise* of the passages referred to? Is there any recognizable difference of tone, for example, between 972 b 2 and *Tim.* 28 b 2 ὁ δὲ πᾶς οὐρανός—ἡ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ' ἂν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ' ἡμῶν ὀνομάσθω. Both are ways of saying that it is indifferent whether we use the word οὐρανός or κόσμος, or, the *Epinomis* adds, ὄλυμπος, so long as we understand the same thing by these various names, and how is there more rhetorical πάθος in one of the expressions given to this thought than in the other? And, again, as regards the use of *anaphora*. Dr. Müller can hardly mean to suggest that there is anything un-Platonic in the mere employment of the figure, as he can hardly have forgotten *Phd.* 78 a 3 πολλή μὲν ἢ Ἑλλάς . . . πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, or *Phaedr.* 247 d 5 καθορᾶ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾶ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾶ δὲ ἐπιστήμην. More probably, his objection is that there is a πάθος in these passages which makes the employment of the figure appropriate, but that there is no such justification for it at *Epin.* 981 d 7. But we might say the same thing about *Tim.* 87 a 5, where it is said of certain νοσήματα that they ποικίλλει μὲν εἶδη δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυμίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασυτήτος τε καὶ δειλίας, or, if we were bent on carping, even of *Critias*, 117 a 2 πρέποντα μὲν τῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς μεγέθει, πρέποντα δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ κόσμῳ, since it might be argued that the repetition of πρέποντα is needless and prompted by a hankering after a πάθος not appropriate to the context.

Why the simple and earnest words of *Epin.* 992 a 4 οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, αὕτη ἢ τροφή, ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα should be 'sufficient proof' of spuriousness is not absolutely clear, but since they are quoted as the supreme exhibition of the πάθος of the dialogue, I suppose it is meant that the feeling with which they are charged is not in keeping with the πάθος of Plato, as shown, e.g., in the *Laws*. If that is the meaning, I can only reply that Dr. Müller has strangely misread the

work Plato intended as his greatest legacy to mankind. It is manifest from the passionate pleadings of *Laws*, x, that Plato, at the end of his life, was convinced that the right ordering of life is absolutely impossible except on the basis of such a theology as is expounded there; this is the reason why he would, if he could, establish an Inquisition to deal with the three forms of false religious belief which act as a moral poison in society. How intense his feelings were in the matter we see most readily, if we read the direct address to the heretic which is appended to the refutation of each of the three 'heresies', and observe how the tone changes from reasoned and patient apologetics (addressed to the simple atheist), through remonstrance (with the denier of providence), to indignant denunciation (in the case of the devotee of immoral superstition). The last possible uncertainty whether this theology represents ardent personal conviction or is advocated on grounds of 'social utility' should be removed when we find its main doctrines urged with equal vehemence in *Ep.* vii. 335 *a-b*. And again it is equally certain from *Laws*, xii. 967 *d* 4 ff., that Plato regards the scientific astronomy of which he preaches the need as one of the two indispensable foundations of his theology and religion. It has been said that religion has two foundations, ontology and ethics. Plato, for whom ontology and ethics are inseparable, makes his second foundation astronomy, because it is from astronomy that we learn that the cosmic motions really are strictly 'orderly', and that the ἀρίστη ψυχή is thus, in fact, the ψυχή which actually governs the world. The πάθος of the passage in which the *Epinomis* dwells on the native endowments, educational discipline, and scientific attainments requisite for the highest human beatitude is thus identical with that of the *Laws*, or at any rate of *Laws*, x and xii. That this feeling should find the expression it does in our dialogue is no proof that our author was Plato; it is fair reason for holding that he may be Plato, until stronger reasons have been adduced on the other side.

We begin to understand what Dr. Müller means better if we follow his argument a little further. The *Laws*, he says, is a true dialogue, though nearly everything in it comes from a single speaker, to whom the others have merely to say Yes and No at the proper intervals. It is a true dialogue because it is never forgotten that the Athenian is addressing citizens of two remarkable political communities, whose character as representatives of those communities affects the whole situation. In the *Epinomis* Megillus and Clinias are retained, but they are 'dummies', from the very outset at 973 a 1, where they are introduced, in wholly un-Platonic fashion, and 'mechanically' by the words of Clinias, πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἤκομεν ἅπαντες κτλ. In fact, it is meant, the two characters are for the writer merely the *Herren Anwesende* who form the audience at a lecture. If he was not really thinking of an audience or a body of readers, if he had not lost complete sight of the dramatic situation, how could he speak of three persons and no more as πάντες? Clearly, when he says 'we', he is not thinking of the three characters of the *Laws* but of a body of fellow-students *mitten im Kolleg*, and he betrays the fact when he makes the Athenian refer (980 d 4) to the *memoranda* (ὑπομνήματα) which the others had taken of his refutation of 'atheism'. These peculiarities would be intelligible if one may suppose that the *Epinomis* was composed by its author as the epilogue to a series of 'readings' in which Plato's *Laws* were recited, before circulation, to an audience of disciples (pp. 66-7).

Again I interrupt the course of Dr. Müller's argument to comment on the conclusiveness of some of his criticisms. The reason why three persons may be called πάντες or ἅπαντες is simple, viz. that they are one too many to be called ἄμφω. Cf. Aristotle, *De Coelo* A, 268 a 10, καθάπερ γὰρ φασι καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὄρισταί. The ἅπαντες of the *Epinomis* need not therefore be taken to mean any one but the characters of the dialogue. Nor do I agree with the comments Dr. Müller, following Professor Jaeger, makes on the allusion to ὑπομνήματα. It is not only

university students who make *memoranda*. It is true that no reference is made in the *Laws* itself to the taking of 'notes'. But when we remember that the situation in that dialogue is that Clinias and the rest are apparently walking out to inspect the site of a proposed city for which Clinias is officially a Commissioner (702 b-d),¹ it is unlikely that they would not be provided, between them, with the means of recording observations; Clinias has probably his 'tablets' with him. It would therefore be perfectly possible that notes might have been made of points of importance in the discourses of the Athenian, and we are not *bound* to suppose that the reference to such notes betrays a writer for whom the *Laws* is a 'prelection' to a university class. The bald opening of our dialogue seems to be an actual reminiscence of that of the *Sophistes* (216 a 1) *κατὰ τὴν χθὲς ὁμολογίαν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἤκομεν κτλ.* This is equally possible whether our author is Plato himself or not. It is true that in the *Sophistes* the interest is kept up by the introduction of a new leading character, but we should not in any case expect Plato himself at the age of eighty to be equal to himself some twelve or fifteen years earlier.

To return to Dr. Müller. In effect, he says, the author of the *Epinomis* is complimenting his audience of fellow Academics by declaring them one and all to be competent for membership of the *νυκτερινὸς σύλλογος* of the *Laws*. (For the education he describes as that 'we' are to acquire is formally the same which the *Laws* required of the members of that supreme Council.) But this very compliment shows that our writer does not understand the spirit of the *Laws*. His 'political situation' is not that contemplated by Plato. To Plato the *νυκτερινὸς σύλλογος* is a real political institution; for our author it is a literary fiction. To 'Philippus' the city of the *Laws* and its institutions have no

¹ It is not expressly said that Clinias's excursion is one of inspection of the site of the city, but I think we may fairly infer from his regarding the meeting with the Athenian as an *οἰωνός* (702 c 2) that his business is in some way connected with his function as Commissioner.

real significance; the 'city' to him means the existing 'empirical' πόλις of which he and his audience are members. Hence, whereas the *Laws* treats σοφία as something demanded to fit 'rulers' in particular for their work of governing, the *Epinomis* speaks of it as possible for private citizens as well as for magistrates (976 d 2 ὁ δὲ λαβῶν . . . σοφὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸς δι' αὐτὴν πολίτης τε καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως ἔσται). The value of σοφία for politics is thought of as secondary; its primary worth lies in its contribution to the εὐδαιμονία of the individual. Virtue, as understood by 'Philippus', is not, as for Plato, at once one and differentiated; it has become a *unum necessarium*. This amounts to a surrender of the 'specifically political and complex ἀρετή-concept of Plato'. What Plato looked for in the πόλις 'Philippus' looks for 'in the perfect πόλις of the κόσμος', or 'in an existence that will follow upon our present imperfect earthly state' (p. 69). The audience for whom he is writing is a circle whose real interest is in the problems of religion (p. 70), and his object is to defend the thesis that scientific and religious education are one and the same against the 'claim of the religious man to go his own way' (p. 71); the peculiar 'religiosity' of the *Epinomis* is the most important point of difference between it and the *Laws*. The work, then, is a piece of 'protreptic',¹ and this explains why it is so earnest in preaching the value of such 'simple and presumably (*vermeintlich*) familiar things' as arithmetic, geometry, stereometry, and astronomy, especially the last, and why he avoids technical terminology to the excess of actually doing his best to escape using the technical names of these 'familiar' sciences (*ib.*).

Now it seems to me that it would be difficult to commit a worse double mistake than that which reveals itself in these paragraphs. In the first place Dr. Müller, as we have seen, completely misconceives the point of what is said in the *Epinomis* itself about the sciences of mathematics and astronomy. These sciences, as conceived by our author, are

¹ Are there many Platonic dialogues which are *not* 'protreptic'?

not 'simple and familiar things', but the very reverse. Astronomy—as with Plato, both in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*—is not what it would be taken to be by all but a very small scientific circle, acquaintance with the observed facts of the heliacal risings and settings of various constellations which are important to the farmer, the vine-grower, and the sailor, but the mathematical analysis of the highly complicated paths of the planets, and the precise determination of their orbits. 'Geometry' and 'stereometry', properly studied, are not independent and autonomous disciplines, dealing with lengths, areas, volumes, and thus dependent on the experiences which give rise to the measurement of fields and the gauging of receptacles. As sciences they form two divisions within the theory of numbers, the study respectively of the quadratic and the cubic irrationals, and the 'theory of number' itself is thus not identical with that part of it which is commonly known by that name, the theory of the natural integers. Nor is this all that our writer means to say. His reference to the way in which the key to all the secrets of 'nature' is an understanding of the various 'means' in the several progressions between the 'double' and its half (990 *e* 2 ὡς περὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἀεὶ στρεφόμενης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτη καθ' ἑκάστην ἀναλογίαν εἶδος καὶ γένος ἀποτυπῶνται πᾶσα ἢ φύσις) must certainly be taken to include an allusion to the problems of the 'side and diagonal' and the 'duplication of the cube'. He means to indicate a conviction that the same arithmetical methods which have been found applicable to the determination of the 'diagonal'—that is, to the finding of $\sqrt{2}$ —can be applied equally in a general way for the determination of the whole series of quadratic and cubic 'irrational roots'. It is evidently hoped that the determinations thus obtained will, besides providing exact expressions for lengths, areas, and volumes, enable us to make precise computations of the period of any 'planet' in terms of that of any other. In fact, the words I have quoted presuppose the same general conception of the physical world

which we know from the *Timaeus*. There the elementary constituents of all bodies are said to be triangles of two types, each exhibiting a great variety of size, and in each of these types of triangle one of the ratios between the sides is 'irrational'.¹ This is why any physical problem may involve at least one problem in the study of numbers which are 'in their own nature dissimilar', but are rendered 'similar' by raising to the second or third power. The two problems the writer has in his mind in 990 *c-d* are, in fact, the insertion of one and of two mean proportionals between any two given integers; the first requires the determination of the series of 'square roots', the second the determination of the series of 'cube roots'. The first admits of a simple geometrical solution (*Eucl.* vi. 13) which may be presumed to have been known in the fifth century; the second is notoriously insoluble geometrically without the use of curves not capable of construction by the methods of Euclid, and it was apparently with a view to its solution that Archytas studied the curve of intersection of the cone and cylinder, and the Academy itself the 'conic sections'. What our author is demanding is something still more difficult, the *numerical* solution of the problem to any desired degree of approximation. This is something so far from being elementary or familiar that, as we all know, Aristotle was merely intrigued by the 'perversity' of methods which seemed to him to confuse the two radically distinct species of τὸ ποσόν. And there is a similar reason, over and above the more obvious one, for the way in which our dialogue speaks of ἀστρονομία. It is not only Hesiod whose astronomy is insufficiently 'scientific'. From one single hint we discover that the diurnal revolution of the ἀπλανές is only apparent. Hence the astronomical scheme of Eudoxus, which depends on treating this revolution as a component of every planetary trajectory must be wrong in its founda-

¹ In the isosceles triangle used by Timaeus the ratio of either 'side' to the 'hypotenuse' is $1 : \sqrt{2}$, in his scalene triangle the ratio of the lesser side to the greater is $1 : \sqrt{3}$.

tions.¹ All this is strictly in accord with all we know of Platonic mathematics, and I confess I find it hard to understand the brief and authoritative way in which it is laid down if the writer is any one but the head of the Academy itself.

The more serious confusion, however, is that which seems to be implied in what is said of Plato himself by way of contrast with 'Philippus'. Here, again, we are dealing with what I should call a distorted exaggeration of the real facts. It is the fact that Plato's own lifelong, deepest interests were, as he tells us himself in *Ep.* vii, those of the statesman and moral reformer, and also that the Academy, in Plato's later years, was composed chiefly of Ionian students who knew nothing of serious free political activity, and cared comparatively little for it. But it would be a complete mistake to suppose that Plato himself conceived of science and religion as incapable of existing except as instruments of social activity in an ideally managed πόλις, or that he thought there was no field for them in the 'empirical πόλις' of his later years. Since, as Burnet has recently said,² it is clear from *Ep.* vii, as well as from the dialogues themselves, that Plato regarded the real life of his own πόλις as ended by the events of 404-403, or at any rate by the condemnation of Socrates, which made it impossible to hope anything from the restored democracy, why did he think it worth while to found the Academy at all, if he held the view Dr. Müller ascribes to him? It is certain that he was never under the delusion that the great time before the Archidamian war could be revived by miracle at Athens or anywhere else. What, then, was his purpose in devoting his life

¹ 987 b 6 ff. The implication made explicit by Burnet's addition of <οὐκ> before ἄγων in b 8 is already there in the MSS. text. If the ἀπλανές does not carry the planets round, it follows, of course, that the appearance that it does so must be due to a real diurnal motion of the earth in the opposite sense. The diurnal revolution of the ἀπλανές itself must therefore be only apparent: the movement from east to west assigned to it by the dialogue is presumably real, but its period, which is not mentioned, cannot be the 'day'.

² *Platonism*, p. 29.

to the education of young men in ἀρετή and 'philosophy'? The *Republic* itself will give us the answer, if we read it attentively. The true 'philosopher' will not discharge his function to the full unless he has the good fortune to be 'in his own city', where he will have power and authority as well as wisdom, but wherever he is, he will be able at least to reform his own soul and order his own life on the right lines, and his influence will make itself felt around him. We read the *Republic* very superficially, if we do not discover that what Socrates there is most of all in earnest about is not the realization of a political Utopia, but the right conduct of his own life and the lives of his auditors. The moral of the myth with which the dialogue concludes 'will save us' into 'eternal life', if we follow it faithfully (621 c 1), though Socrates has clearly no hopes for the political salvation of the 'democratic city'. Why, again, did Plato think it a duty to go to Syracuse at Dion's invitation? Not, as he makes plain enough in his own explanation, in the dream of founding a city of 'philosophers', but because the conversion of Dionysius to a better way of life might make him capable of doing something to prevent Greek civilization in Sicily from extinction. Or why, again, did Plato devote laborious years in his old age to writing the *Laws*, except for the reason that he held strongly that something can be done by the 'philosopher' for personal and public morality, even with highly unideal conditions. In the least favourable conditions, when the philosopher, in the phrase of the *Republic*, is driven to wrap himself in his own virtue and take shelter 'under a wall' from the tempest round him, his life is, at any rate, an *example* of fidelity to a right standard of the worth of different goods, and a right preparation for the 'journey of a thousand years'. It is a paradox, to my mind, to maintain that the man who wrote the *Gorgias* and *Republic* could see no value in the μαθήματα except in an 'ideal state' in which they are the passport to a seat among the νομοφύλακες, and I therefore regard the antithesis between the 'religiosity' of the *Epinomis* and the spirit of the

writer of the *Gorgias* and the great encomium on the philosopher's life in the *Theaetetus* as purely fanciful. Indeed, I think it would be more pertinent to argue that the 'religiosity' of our dialogue is typically non-Ionian, and by this I mean typically different from that of the whole of the rational science which had its original home in Ionia, in the prominence it gives to the thought of the divine care for man and treatment of men according to their moral 'deserts'. On the great question which really divides Platonist and Aristotelian, the question of the *status* of the 'practical life' in the scheme of things—it is really the same issue which Kant was to raise by his doctrine of the 'primacy' of the practical interest of reason over the speculative—our author is on the side definitely rejected in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The un-Platonic 'religiosity' is that of the pages in the *Ethics* which expressly exclude the practice of the 'moral virtues' from the life of the *θεῖόν τι* in man.

The considerations advanced in the preceding pages do not, of course, prove, and it is impossible ever to prove strictly, that Plato was the writer of the *Epinomis*. I think they should be sufficient to show that it is not proved by Dr. Müller's careful and minute investigations that he was not, when once we take into account the certainty that the work, if genuine, must be the work of a very aged and very weary writer, and the high probability, from some of its peculiarities of diction, that it has never been revised for circulation and possibly was, in the first instance, not written by the author but dictated. That probability would, I believe, be increased by considering one or two passages where the text as we have it is simply untranslatable, and yet transcriptional corruption seems decidedly unlikely. An example is the *διεξελοῦσα* of 976 d 6, where it seems unlikely to assume with Hermann an actual corruption of *ἀν ἐξελοῦσα*, though that is the sense demanded. Another is the *νέου* of 980 e 1, where the sense demands *χείρονος* or an equivalent, and yet no probable 'correction'

is available, and yet a third the unintelligible ἡ ταύτη ὡς πάντη ταύτη (so AL, πάντη O) of 984 b 1. I am not sure that the πλανητῶν, which Burnet brackets at 986 b 2, is not a fourth. The ἀπλανῶν which Ast substituted is what the sense demands, yet one cannot believe in a 'corruption' of ἀπλανῶν to πλανητῶν by transcribers, and I myself find it almost as impossible to believe that ἄστρων should have been 'glossed' wrongly in a context where the meaning is obvious. I believe the difficult and ungrammatical ὁ μὲν of 988 c 2 requires treatment on the same lines. The slips in the places previously cited are exactly of the kind that might be made by an old man dictating without himself reading over what he had dictated afterwards, and I do not see any other equally satisfactory explanation of their occurrence. Similarly the ὁ μὲν of 988 c 2 reads to me like the language of some one dictating, aware that he had just said in effect 'the first theologians related the origin of the gods and the history of their births', and intending to add 'and one of them gave a narrative of the actions of these gods', but not alive to the fact that the particular form of expression he had adopted, ὅτε περὶ θεῶν ἦν ἀνθρώποις διανοήματα πρῶτα, makes the continuation with ὁ μὲν impossible.¹ This is just the sort of oversight all men, especially men who are old and feeble, make in dictating their thoughts, but I cannot conceive any man *writing* the words and letting them stand uncorrected. There are a number of other passages of the same kind in the dialogue, but it will be enough to have specified the foregoing five or six; they suggest that an investigation of the *Epinomis* is incomplete if it does not include a careful attempt to answer the question whether it does not bear upon it evident marks of being a dictated composition. If it is that, we may be fairly sure that Plato was its author for the double reason that his great age explains the fact of the dictation and the reverence of his disciples for their master equally explains, as no other consideration will, why such obvious slips were not corrected.

¹ See *supra*, p. 65 n.

One final remark in which I hope I am doing no injustice to Dr. Müller. His thorough industry deserves the highest praise, but he leaves one with the strong impression that he began the examination of our dialogue with a mind already made up. 'Trifles light as air' become to him 'proofs' of spuriousness because he is content to *assume* that every one knows the dialogue to be spurious. Has he ever thought of trying the control experiment of looking out for the points which might be fixed on by an advocate anxious to prove a case on the other side? And, apart from consideration of internal evidence, has he asked himself whether it is not significant that Proclus had apparently never heard of any one before his own time who doubted the genuineness of the dialogue, since, anxious as he was to prove it spurious, he made no appeal to testimony on the point?¹

¹ I am afraid the ascription of the *Epinomis* to Philippus is in some danger of becoming a school-dogma with the pupils of Professor Jaeger. F. Solmsen calls on us to observe that 'Philippus' directly opposes *τύχη* to *θέος* at *Epin.* 976 e 3 (*θεὸν δ' αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τινα τύχην ἡγοῦμαι δόντα ἡμῶν σώζων ἡμᾶς*). Such a contrast, says S., would have been impossible to Plato (*Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik*, p. 138, n. 1). Who is it who traces back speculative atheism to the view that not *τέχνη* but *φύσις καὶ τύχη* are the causes of 'fire and water and earth and air'? (*Laws*, 889 b 1). S. says Plato 'knows no *αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν* but *θεία τύχη*'. Plato's own words shall refute him: *ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν* (*Laws*, 896 d 5).



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